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ABSTRACT
MATTHEW HORNE: Essays on Dynamic Contract Theory.
(Under the direction of Gary Biglaiser)
This dissertation studies the role of asymmetric information in dynamic contracts. Through two
chapters, I examine the relationship between constraints on liquidity and the dynamics of adverse
selection. In general, these two features combine to generate inefficiency in the optimal contract, and
each chapter explores the magnitude of this inefficiency in different dynamic settings. In the first
chapter, I characterize the relationship between persistence in private information and liquidity. By
contrast, in the second chapter, I highlight the impact of liquidity on dynamic network effects.
More specifically, in my first chapter I study a dynamic adverse selection model where a long-
lived agent contracts with a long-lived principal for the provision of a good in each period. The agent
is liquidity constrained and possesses private information about her preferences for the principal’s
good that evolve over time and are autocorrelated. Employing techniques from Fernandes and Phelan
(2000), I characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a concave dynamic programming problem,
where the state variables are the previous period’s reported type as well as on and off path promised
expected lifetime utilities. Through analytical results and simulations, I find that the optimal contract
backloads rents and that there exists a threshold state after which the contract calls for the efficient
provision of the good. Moreover, the optimal contract exhibits short-run distortions in the provision
of the good when the state is below the threshold. Notably, I find that the liquidity constraint causes
inefficiency that lingers long after it would have been resolved if there were no constraints on the
agent’s liquidity.
On the other hand, in the second chapter I study a dynamic-adverse selection setting where a long-
lived principal contracts with overlapping generations of agents for the provision of a service in each
period. Throughout the duration of the contract, each agent’s preferences for the service are affected by
both their privately observed, i.i.d. characteristic and the characteristic of any other agent contracting
iii
with the principal. I adopt the techniques of Krishna, Lopomo, and Taylor (2013) and characterize
the optimal contract as the solution to a dynamic programming problem, where the state is promised
lifetime utility. I find that the optimal contract is monotone in state, backloaded, and exhibits the no
distortion at the top property. Moreover, the optimal contract is biased in favor of older agents.
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CHAPTER 1
LIQUIDITY-CONSTRAINED DYNAMIC CONTRACTING WITH PERSISTENCE
1.1 Introduction
Consider a dynamic principal-agent problem where both the principal and the agent can commit to
a long-term contract. Real world instances of such interactions include venture capital, insurance con-
tracts, managerial compensation, and the repeated sale of a non-durable good. Although there are many
important features to each of these economic interactions, all four contractual environments share two
aspects: the agent typically has a limited budget and her preferences evolve over time according to a
privately known characteristic. In particular, this private information is frequently correlated across
time.
To understand these two key aspects, consider the real world example of insurance contracts. In
this market, the agent engages in a long-term contract with the principal who provides the agent with
her insurance.1 Throughout this contract, the agent’s preferences for insurance coverage vary over
time and are affected by her autocorrelated private information; e.g., her income, health, or driving
skills. In addition, the agent lacks access to sufficient credit and/or faces a budget constraint. As
such, in any single period, the agent cannot afford to pay out-of-pocket for the full cost of her health
care, her automobile repair, or debts upon death. This is a key role of insurance – not only to allow
the agent to hedge against what she is insured, but also to smooth the costs of catastrophic events over
many periods. However, in a general contracting environment that shares some features with insurance
policies, I will show that the agent’s budget constraint is the driving force behind the inefficiency in
the optimal contract. Moreover, this effect is exacerbated by the degree of persistence in the agent’s
private information.
1Most contracts ordinarily have a fixed duration, and in the insurance example, the duration is often a year. Throughout
this chapter, by long-term I mean infinite horizon. There are several benefits to this approach. First, many of the results
in this chapter carry over to a finite horizon setting. Second, in many real world applications, the principal and agent are
interacting frequently, and, as such, an infinite horizon model provides a close approximation to reality. Lastly, there are
mathematical advantages to using infinite horizon contracts not shared by a finite horizon setting.
Abstracting to this general framework, there are several salient features to my contracting en-
vironment: (a) The principal and agent engage in a long-term relationship for the provision of the
principal’s good; (b) the agent has private information about her marginal utility that is persistent and
correlated across time; and, (c) the agent has limited available funds each period and thus is liquid-
ity constrained. Prior works have investigated some of these contractual features; notably Battaglini
(2005) and Krishna et al. (2013). However, the joint interaction between all of these features is still
not fully understood in the existing literature. Therefore, in this chapter, I contribute to the literature
by examining how persistence in the agent’s private information interacts with constraints on her liq-
uidity. And, in doing so, I uncover unique attributes in the optimal dynamic contract that would not be
present absent either the Markovian information structure or the liquidity constraint.
More formally, I study an infinite-horizon, discrete-time screening model between a long-lived
principal and a long-lived agent. Each period, the principal produces a non-durable good for which
the agent has demand. The agent’s marginal utility for this good depends on her privately observed
type, which can either be high or low and evolves over time according to a Markov process. Both the
principal and the agent are committed and have quasilinear, time-separable preferences.2
Without the liquidity constraint and persistence of private information, full efficiency can be achieved
by selling the principal’s firm to the agent at the expected present discounted value of first-best pro-
duction. However, either main assumption individually precludes the optimality of this solution. The
presence of a liquidity constraint, irrespective of the information structure, implies that the agent lacks
the cash flow necessary to purchase the firm outright. On the other hand, the presence of persistent
private information injects residual uncertainty into the expected present discounted value of the firm.
Therefore, even if the agent is liquid enough to purchase the firm, it is not necessarily optimal for the
principal to offer the sale.3 Consequently, either main assumption implies that in order for the agent to
2In application, the assumption of full commitment by both parties is not realistic, as many instances of dynamic
contracts feature renegotiation and limits to commitment. Full commitment can be justifiable in settings where the principal
and agent have reputation concerns. This chapter does not consider such features, and restricts attention to the commitment
case to simplify analysis and isolate the interaction between persistent private information and liquidity. For more on
limited commitment insurance contracts, consult Kocherlakota (1996), Hendel and Lizzeri (2003), and Karaivanova and
Martin (2015).
3As is shown in Battaglini (2005), with persistent private information, it is optimal to sell the firm only when the agent
reports a high type. This stems from the fact that the expected value of the firm depends on the agent’s current type.
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receive the good, she must engage in a long-term contract with the principal.
Therefore, this environment requires a dynamic screening model, where the principal incentivizes
the agent through the provision of instantaneous rents, promises of future rents, and quantities. This
chapter explores the optimal usage of these instruments, and finds several key properties of the optimal
contract. I highlight these properties through both analytical results and simulations of the optimal
contract. I find that: (i) The optimal contract is backloaded – the agent does not receive instantaneous
rents until she has accumulated a promise of future rents above a certain threshold; (ii) the binding
liquidity constraint induces short-run distortions in the allocation of the good to the low-type agent; (iii)
these distortions persist until the agent’s promise of future rents reaches the aforementioned threshold;
and (iv), if the rents promised to the agent are sufficiently low, then the provision of the good to the
low type will be distorted away from first-best even after multiple consecutive high type draws by the
agent.
Finally, I demonstrate that the structure of the optimal contract is directly affected by the strength of
the liquidity constraint. As the agent becomes more illiquid, the optimal contract becomes increasingly
inefficient, and eventually the principal will decline participation with the agent. On the other hand,
as the agent becomes sufficiently liquid, the liquidity constraint does not bind in the optimal contract,
and thus the agent will receive the efficient provision of the good much sooner.
Returning to the example of insurance, the contract design problem in this market is complicated.
Firms potentially face adverse selection and moral hazard, and thus desire to screen consumers. One
prominent method of screening is price discrimination, and this chapter focuses solely on how adverse
selection affects optimal price discrimination.4 Several aspects of the general contract that I present in
this chapter have direct analogues in the market for insurance. For instance, insurance premiums are
Therefore the agent has private information about both the current and future surplus. As a result, selling the firm to both
of the agent’s types requires that the principal sacrifice to the high type not only this period’s information rent, but also
future period’s, which is suboptimal. On the other hand, when private information is i.i.d., this is not a complication, as the
expected value of the firm is independent of the agent’s current type.
4There is evidence of adverse selection in many insurance markets. For example, Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999) survey
the literature on health insurance, where many studies identify adverse selection through positive correlation between
health insurance coverage and risk occurrence. In the U.K. annuities insurance market, Finkelstein and Poterba (2014)
conclude that insurance companies act as if there is asymmetric information. Similar to health insurance, Cohen (2005)
finds evidence of adverse selection in the Israeli automobile insurance market by observing positive correlation between
insurance coverage and car accidents.
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merely a way of capturing instantaneous rents, whereas the coverage of a policy is a direct promise of
expected future rents.
My main results can also be interpreted through the language of insurance. The use of a deductible
is both a backloading of rents and an explicit threshold for the delivery of these rents, a main feature
in my abstract optimal contract. This chapter’s other central result – that the provision of the good to
the low-type agent is distorted away from first-best when the agent is below her deductible – requires
institutional details of specific insurance markets. Consider auto insurance and suppose that the agent
gets into a single-vehicle accident, like driving over an especially large pothole. If this incident causes
damage to the agent’s car, like wheel misalignment or suspension damage, the first-best provision of
coverage is for the agent to report the accident to her insurance company and repair her car. However,
if the cost of repair is low relative to the agent’s collision deductible and she expects higher future
premiums, the agent may prefer to not report the accident to her insurance company and pay for the
repair out-of-pocket. But, if the agent is budget constrained, she may have to delay the repair until
she has the cash flow necessary to afford this expense. That is, the deductible, in conjunction with the
agent’s budget constraints, incentivizes an inefficient allocation of insurance coverage.
This chapter is laid out as follows: In the next Section, I review the related literature. In Section 2.3,
I formally introduce the model and explicitly describe my contract in Section 1.3.1. I then move onto
intermediate results in Section 1.4, and characterize the liquidity unconstrained optimal contract in
Section 1.4.1. I solve for the optimal contract in Sections 1.4.2 and 1.5. In Section 1.6, I discuss short-
run properties of the optimal contract through both analytical results and simulations. Additionally,
I remark on the long-run properties of the optimal contract. In Section 1.7, I generalize the liquidity
constraint to accommodate changes in the agent’s liquidity. Finally, in Section 1.8, I conclude and
explore future work. All proofs are contained within Appendix A.
1.2 Related Literature
My work belongs to the extensive literature on dynamic contracting, and follows in the spirit of
Baron and Besanko (1984), who investigate optimal regulation in a dynamic setting when the regulator
can fully commit. This chapter adopts a recursive approach to solve the contracting problem, which
stems from the early work of Green (1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1988),
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and Thomas and Worrall (1990). Within this literature, the contracting problem is solved by using
promised future utility as a state variable, and thus the optimal contract can be determined using
techniques from dynamic programming.
Unlike this earlier literature, which focuses on i.i.d. private information, this chapter allows for
persistent private information. Several recent works explore dynamic contracts with persistent private
information under various settings. These include continuous time in Williams (2011), continuous
type spaces in Kapicˇka (2013), and general environments in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014). Instead,
I opt to use the framework of Fernandes and Phelan (2000), who extend the discrete time, finite type
space environment of Thomas and Worrall (1990) to Markovian private information. In Fernandes
and Phelan (2000), the optimal contract can be characterized by a simple type space, where the state
is comprised of on equilibrium and off equilibrium part promised lifetime utility, as well as the pre-
vious period’s reported type. This is in contrast to the aforementioned more recent contributions to
the literature, all of which employ a first-order approach to tackle incentive compatibility. As a re-
sult, Williams (2011), Kapicˇka (2013), and Pavan et al. (2014) impose non-trivial restrictions on the
underlying fundamentals of their models.
Using the framework of Fernandes and Phelan (2000), my model contributes to the literature on
dynamic adverse selection. I focus on the results in Battaglini (2005), who studies a screening model
between a principal and an agent whose type can take on two values and evolves according to a Markov
process. Battaglini (2005) finds that the optimal contract is, without loss of generality, an option
contract for the sale of the firm as soon as the agent reveals herself to be a high type. Therefore, when
the agent reports a high type, she receives both the efficient provision of the good today and in all
subsequent periods, irrespective of her future type draws. On the other hand, an agent who has drawn
exclusively low types receives an allocation that is distorted downward from first-best. Consequently,
in the limit the optimal contract converges to first-best, since in the limit the agent will draw a high
type at least once with probability one.
Critical to Battaglini (2005) is the fact that there are no bounds on transfers. As a result, the
principal is able to extract all future information rents from a high-type agent by charging a very large
transfer whenever the agent reports a high type. Importantly, this means that the principal is the residual
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claimant on all information rents. My work seeks to place a limit on the principal’s ability to contract
large transfers, and thus I assume that the agent is liquidity constrained. In this regard, my work shares
similarities to Krishna et al. (2013), who also consider a dynamic screening problem where the agent
is liquidity constrained. Krishna et al. (2013) restrict attention to i.i.d. private information, and find
that the liquidity constraint is the driving force behind both the reason for long-term contracting and
the presence of inefficiencies in the contract.
Other recent studies examine extensions of Battaglini (2005), and find limits to the robustness of the
result. Luz (2013) extends Battaglini (2005) to permit risk aversion as well as competition, and finds
that often the optimal contract is inefficient. Battaglini and Lamba (2014) expand Battaglini (2005) to
more than two types and employ a first-order approach to solve incentive compatibility. Battaglini and
Lamba (2014) find that when private information is sufficiently persistent, the first-order approach is
not valid. Kwon (2014) considers a related problem of dynamic moral hazard, where the production
technology has a latent state that is partially persistent and unknown to both the principal and agent.
Although the framework in Kwon (2014) differs from the pure adverse selection of my model, Kwon
(2014) nonetheless finds a similar result in the backloading of rents via an initial probationary period
followed by a tenuring of the agent.
Most similar to my own work is Guo and Ho¨rner (2015) and Fu and Krishna (2015), as shown in
Table 1.1. Guo and Ho¨rner (2015) consider the setting of Battaglini (2005), but restrict attention to
contracts without transfers. Guo and Ho¨rner (2015) find that in the limit there are two absorbing points,
one that corresponds to the first-best contract, and one that corresponds to an inefficient contract. By
contrast, Fu and Krishna (2015) consider the financing of a young firm by modeling a principal-agent
setting where the agent is privately informed of the firm’s revenue, which evolves according to a
Markov process. Although Fu and Krishna (2015) share many technical aspects with this work – a
dynamic contracting problem with Markovian private information and a liquidity constrained agent –
many other features of their work differ from mine. In particular Fu and Krishna (2015), focuses on
long-run properties of the optimal contract, which allows the discussion of properties of a ‘mature’
firm. My work, instead, examines the short-run properties of a similar contracting environment.
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Table 1.1: Relation to Literature
Unlimited Transfers Liquidity Constrained No Transfers
Markov Battaglini (2005) This chapter Guo and Ho¨rner (2015)
Fu and Krishna (2015)
I.I.D. Standard Krishna et al. (2013) Guo and Ho¨rner (2015)
1.3 Model
A long-lived agent contracts with a long-lived principal for the provision of qt in periods t =
1, 2, 3, ...,∞. Both parties are risk neutral, have time-separable preferences, and share a common
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The principal can deliver qt ∈ R+ to the agent at transfer mt ∈ R. If a qt
is agreed upon, then the principal will incur cost c(qt), where c : R+ → R+ is convex, continuously
differentiable, and limq→0 c′(q) = −∞.
At the beginning of each period, the agent draws her type θt ∈ {θL, θH} ≡ Θ, 0 < θL < θH <
∞, where θt is the marginal value of quantity qt. The agent’s type θt is private information and
evolves according a Markov process with probability f(θt|θt−1), where f(θt|θt−1) > 0 for all θt, θt−1.
I restrict attention to the case in which θt is positively correlated. In other words, I assume that
ρ ≡ f(θH |θH) − f(θH |θL) ≥ 0. All of my results carry over with minor qualitative modifications if
ρ < 0; however, I ignore this case to avoid excessive exposition.
Now, define the agent’s flow payoff as ut ≡ θtqt − mt, which implies that the principal’s flow
payoff mt − c(qt) can be written instead as θtqt − c(qt) − ut. In designing the optimal contract, I
will use the latter specification of the principal’s flow payoff, and invoke the Revelation Principle to
restrict attention to direct mechanisms for ut and qt. Moreover, I use promises of on path promised
and off path threatened future utility wt and wˆt to convert the sequential problem into a recursive one
(Fernandes and Phelan 2000). In doing so, I generate a state vector given by the triple (θ−, v, vˆ, ),
where θ− is the previous period’s reported type, v is on path promised expected lifetime utility after
telling the truth last period, and vˆ is off path threatened expected lifetime utility after lying last period.
I generically refer to the state vector as s ≡ (θ−, v, vˆ).
Promised expected lifetime utility v is a natural state variable, and common to many dynamic
contracting problem. Threatened expected lifetime utility vˆ, however, is much less ubiquitous. To un-
derstand its role, recall that private information is Markovian, and thus the distribution of the agent’s
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type this period depends on the previous period’s draw. If the principal is misinformed about the
agent’s previous period type, then there is a schism between the principal’s beliefs about the distri-
bution of the agent’s type and its true distribution. As such, the principal is constrained by both the
true path of θt but also all other potential θˆt. Therefore, the principal must keep track of both on path
promised lifetime utility and off path threatened lifetime utility.
With this in mind, given the state vector s = (θ−, v, vˆ, ), a contract is defined as b : Θ2×R2+ → R4+,
where
b(θ; s) ≡ (q(θ; s), u(θ; s), w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s)) ,
and q(θ; s) is quantity, u(θ; s) is the agent’s instantaneous rents, w(θ; s) is promised lifetime utility to
the agent, and wˆ(θ; s) is threatened lifetime utility to the agent from lying this period. Altogether, an
agent facing a contract b and state (θ−, v, vˆ) who reports θ˜ receives payoff
u(θ˜; s) + δw(θ˜; s).
Following the report θ˜, next period the state will transition to (θ˜, w(θ˜; s), wˆ(θ˜; s)).
1.3.1 Constraints
Contracts are recursively defined, and therefore their instruments are only a function of today’s
report and the state s = (θ−, v, vˆ). Noticeably, the Revelation Principle initially applies only when
contracts are a function of the entire history of the game. Fortunately, as is shown in Fernandes
and Phelan (2000), the state s sufficiently characterizes the history of the game, and a version of the
Revelation Principle holds in this recursively formulation. However, for this equivalence to hold, the
contract must be subject to several constraints, which I now present.
Promise Keeping. The Promise Keeping constraint requires that the contract satisfy for all s =
(θ−, v, vˆ)
v =
∑
θ=θH ,θL
f(θ|θ−) (u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s)) . (PK)
Promise Keeping imposes that ex ante an agent receives the utility v that was promised to her last
period, and this promise is delivered today through instantaneous rents u(θ; s) and discounted future
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promises δw(θ; s). Recall that v is the promised lifetime utility of an agent who truthfully reports
her type, and thus the Promise Keeping constraint is computed using the probabilities f(θ|θ−). On
equilibrium path, the agent will always truthfully report her type, and thus {f(θL|θ−), f(θH |θ−)} is
the correct distribution of types.
Threat Keeping. The Threat Keeping constraint requires that the contract satisfy, for all s = (θ−, v, vˆ)
and θˆ− 6= θ−
vˆ =
∑
θ=θH ,θL
f(θ|θˆ−) (u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s)) . (TK)
Threat Keeping requires that ex ante an agent receives the utility vˆ if she lied last period, and thus
this constraint is computed using the probabilities f(θ|θˆ−). That is, if the agent lied and misreported θ−
last period, then the true type was θˆ−. Therefore, in the event of a deviation by the agent the previous
period,
{
f(θL|θˆ−), f(θH |θˆ−)
}
is the correct distribution of types this period. On equilibrium path, the
agent will truthfully report her type; however, the pair (u,w) must be credible in the sense that they
could execute the principal’s threat if need be.
Together, the Promise Keeping and Threat Keeping constraints highlight the role of the state
(θ−, v, vˆ) in a recursive contract. In this setting, the contracting problem is simplified by the use
of promises of future lifetime utility. And, in order for these promises to sufficiently summarize the
history of the contract, I must require that the principal deliver upon these promises. Each period, both
the principal and the agent only care about the history insomuch as it affects that period’s incentives
and potential continuation values of the contract, and (PK) and (TK) handle the latter. Specifically, the
principal does not know whether an agent has actually misreported her type. But because (PK) and
(TK) hold, the principal is always delivering both the on path promise v and the off path threat vˆ. And
the constant presence of this threat, along with the next constraint, insures that the agent is perpetually
incentivized to truthfully report her type.
Next is Incentive Compatibility, which resembles its static analogue.
Incentive Compatibility. The Incentive Compatibility constraint requires that the contract satisfy, for
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all θ, θˆ 6= θ, and s = (θ−, v, vˆ)
u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s) ≥ u(θˆ; s) + δwˆ(θˆ; s) + (θ − θˆ)q(θˆ; s). (IC)
Incentive Compatibility imposes that an agent prefers the payoff u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s) of truthfully
reporting her type to misreporting her type, which is equal to u(θˆ; s) + δwˆ(θˆ; s) + (θ − θˆ)q(θˆ; s).
Notice that an agent who misreports her type receives the continuation promise of wˆ(θˆ; s), which
reflect the fact that the principal will be computing her expected payoff next period with the ‘incorrect’
probabilities and differentiates this version of Incentive Compatibility from its canonical forms. In
solving for the optimal contract, I ignore the upward (IC) constraint, and assume that only high types
may misreport. I then verify later that the upward (IC) constraint holds under a parametric restriction.5
Liquidity. The Liquidity constraint requires that the contract satisfy, for all θ and s = (θ−, v, vˆ)
u(θ; s) ≥ 0. (LI)
This Liquidity constraint guarantees that in each period the agent receives nonnegative instanta-
neous rents. This constraint is pivotal to the structure of the optimal contract, and the root of distor-
tions in this contract. In Section 1.7, I generalize to the case in which u(θ; s) ≥ ` for each θ and s,
and ` ∈ R. For ` sufficiently close to 0, much of the structure of the optimal contract will be qualita-
tively unchanged. However, if ` is either sufficiently positive or sufficiently negative, then the optimal
contract will take on extreme forms.
Feasibility. The Feasibility constraint requires that the contract satisfy, for all θ and s = (θ−, v, vˆ),
q(θ; s) ≥ 0. (FE)
5Generally, in dynamic contracting problems with Markovian private information, the upward (IC) constraints are either
non-trivial to verify or are completely ignored. For instance, in both Battaglini (2005) and Guo and Ho¨rner (2015), they
solve for the optimal contract by ignoring these upward (IC) constraints, then later verify that they are satisfied. Fernandes
and Phelan (2000) ignore the upward constraint in their simulations, and Fu and Krishna (2015) similarly disregard the
upward constraint. Like Fernandes and Phelan (2000), I am able to verify that the upward (IC) constraint holds in my
simulations. Moreover, I am able verify that the upward (IC) constraint holds when either θH − θL is large and/or c′ is
concave.
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Feasibility merely requires that quantity be non-negative for each type and state. Now, letW ∗(θ−) ⊂
R2+ be the set of (v, vˆ) such that there exists a contract b that satisfies (PK), (TK), (IC), (FE), and (LI)
under the state (θ−, v, vˆ). It can be shown that W ∗(θ−) is nonempty and compact (Fernandes and
Phelan 2000). In practice, W ∗(θ−) is computed by fixing v and θ−, and then determining the set of vˆ
such that there exists a contract b that satisfies all constraints for the state (θ−, v, vˆ).6
Implementability. The Implementability constraint requires that the contract satisfy, for all θ and
s = (θ−, v, vˆ),
w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s) ∈ W ∗(θ). (IM)
Implementability requires several things. First, it imposes that w and wˆ be nonnegative. No-
tice that by combining (LI) and (IM), it is guaranteed that u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s) ≥ 0. In other words,
if a contract satisfies both Liquidity and Implementability, then the contract is individually rational
for the agent. Second, Implementability imposes restrictions on next period’s contract. That is,
w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s) ∈ W ∗(θ) guarantees that next period, when the state is (θ, w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s)), there
must exist some contract b that satisfies all of the other constraints.
Now I proceed to my first result, which characterizes the principal’s program.
Theorem 1. There exists a unique function P such that the principal’s program can be written as
follows
P (v, vˆ, θ−) = max
b(s)∈Ω(s)
∑
θ
f(θ|θ−) [θq(θ; s)− c(q(θ; s))− u(θ; s)
+δP (w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s), θ)] ,
(PR)
6More precisely, consider the following operator
B(W )(θ−) =

(v, vˆ)|∃(u, q, w, wˆ) such that
u(θ; s), q(θ; s) ≥ 0
v =
∑
θ f(θ|θ−)(u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s))
vˆ =
∑
θ f(θ|θˆ−)(u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s))
(w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s)) ∈W (θ)
u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s) ≥ u(θ˜; s) + δwˆ(θ˜; s) + (θ − θ˜)q(θ˜; s)

.
This is the self-generation operator from Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990). To solve for W ∗(θ−), I iterate this operator
B by fixing v and solving for the set of vˆ that satisfy all of the constraints in each iteration.
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where Ω(s) is the set of contracts that satisfy (PK), (TK), (IC), (LI), (FE), and (IM) under the state
s = (θ−, v, vˆ). Moreover, P has the following properties:
1. P is concave, continuously differentiable in its first two arguments, and, for all θ−,
P1(0, 0, θ−) =∞;
2. For each θ−, there exists (v∗(θ−), vˆ∗(θ−)) ∈ W ∗(θ−) such that if (ν, νˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−), ν ≥ v∗(θ−),
and νˆ ≥ vˆ∗(θ−), then P1(ν, νˆ, θ−) = −1. And if (ν, νˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−), ν < v∗(θ−), and νˆ < vˆ∗(θ−),
then P1(ν, νˆ, θ−) > −1.
3. For each θ−, if (ν, νˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−), ν ≥ v∗(θ−), and νˆ ≥ vˆ∗(θ−), then P2(ν, νˆ, θ−) = 0. And if
(ν, νˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−), ν < v∗(θ−), and νˆ < vˆ∗(θ−), then P2(ν, νˆ, θ−) ≥ 0.
To understand Theorem 1, first look at the objective in (PR): I am taking the expectation Σθf(θ|θ−)
over this period’s type θ, which is conditional on last period’s type θ−. Inside the expectation is
instantaneous surplus θq(θ; s) − c(q(θ; s)), less instantaneous rents u(θ; s), and plus future surplus
δP (w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s), θ). That is, the principal’s objective is the net expected surplus after leaving rents
behind to the agent.
In addition to stating the principal’s objective, Theorem 1 not only provides a way to solve the
contracting problem – via a concave dynamic programming problem – but also says something about
the solution. In particular, there exists some promise v∗(θ−) that maximizes the social surplus v +
P (v, vˆ, θ−), and social surplus is increasing for v < v∗(θ−) and vˆ < vˆ∗(θ−). Moreover, for any
v ≥ v∗(θ−) and vˆ ≥ vˆ∗(θ−), social surplus is flat. In other words, increasing v beyond v∗(θ−)
yields no additional benefit to the principal. Therefore, it is without loss of generality for us to restrict
attention to w(θ; s) ∈ [0, v∗(θ)]. To see this, consider an optimal contract b∗ such that w∗(θ; s) > v∗(θ)
for some (θ; s). Instead, I could find an alternate contract b˜∗ such that w˜∗(θ; s) = v∗(θ), ˜ˆw∗(θ; s) =
min{wˆ∗(θ; s), vˆ∗(θ)}, and u˜∗(θ; s) = u∗(θ; s) + δw∗(θ; s) − δv∗(θ). Notice that b˜∗ delivers the same
payoff to the principal as b∗, but w(θ; s)∗ ≤ v∗(θ) for all (θ; s). Moreover, it can be shown that
(w˜∗(θ; s), ˜ˆw∗(θ; s)) ∈ W ∗(θ). I call such contracts maximal rent contracts, since these maximize the
rents left to the agent.
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I can immediately prove an important property of maximal rent contracts, which is given in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1. In an optimal maximal rent contract, if w∗(θ; s) < v∗(θ), then u∗(θ; s) = 0. Moreover, if
u∗(θ; s) > 0, then w∗(θ; s) = v∗(θ)
Noticeably, Lemma 1 says that the (LI) constraints bind whenever
w∗(θ; s) < v∗(θ),
which is a crucial insight for solving the optimal contract. Moreover, Lemma 1 says that instantaneous
rents are only provided to the agent once she reaches v∗(θ). This result resembles Proposition 1 of
Krishna et al. (2013), who also find a backloading property to rents. Observe that although the choice
of w∗(θ; s) is dependent on θ−, its upper bound v∗(θ) is only conditional upon the reported type in the
current period.
1.4 Intermediate Results
In solving for the optimal contract, I first investigate properties of the contract through a series
of preliminary results. In Section 1.4.1, I characterize the optimal contract without the liquidity con-
straint. Although the results in in this section are not directly used in solving for the optimal liquidity
constrained contract, they are nonetheless instructive and cast a light on the importance of (LI). In
Section 1.4.2, I refine the original problem of solving for the optimal liquidity constrained contract.
1.4.1 No Liquidity Constraint
Before I proceed to the full model, I examine the optimal contract absent the liquidity constraint.
In this case, my model is a generalized version of Battaglini (2005), with the only difference being that
Battaglini (2005) restricts attention to a quadratic cost function.7 Recall that in Battaglini (2005), the
optimal contract is an option for the sale of the firm as soon as the agent reveals herself to be a high
type. Moreover, quantity is distorted downward for an agent who has only drawn low types, but this
distortion converges toward zero as t→∞.
7Methodologically, however, there are significant differences between my work and Battaglini (2005). I opt to solve
the contracting problem via recursive contracts, whereas Battaglini (2005) solves for the optimal sequential contract.
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In this environment, the main result of Battaglini (2005) carries over under a slightly different
interpretation. To state this fact, first, let qFB(θ; s) be the value of q(θ; s) that maximizes (PR) when
the state is s, absent (IC) and (LI) – i.e., the efficient allocation of the good. That is, qFB(θ; s) is
defined as the solution to c′(qFB(θ; s)) = θ. Clearly this solution is independent of the state s, and
thus I omit s in qFB(θ) going forward.
Theorem 2. The optimal contract without the liquidity constraint has the following properties
1. q∗(θH ; θ−, v, vˆ) = qFB(θH)
2. If v < v∗(θ−), q∗(θL, θ−, v, vˆ) < qFB(θL) and if v ≥ v∗(θ−), then q∗(θL; θ−, v, vˆ) = qFB(θL)
3. w∗(θH ; θ−, v, vˆ) = v∗(θH) and w∗(θL; θ−, v, vˆ) ≤ v∗(θL)
Theorem 2 says that the optimal contract without the liquidity constraint has Battaglini’s Gener-
alized No Distortion at the Top property. That is, parts one and two say that the high type receives
first-best and the low type receives a quantity that is distorted weakly downward from first-best. And,
in part three, as soon as the agent reveals herself to be a high type, the principal immediately promises
her v∗(θH). At this point, there is no longer an agency problem, since q∗(θ; s) = qFB(θ) for all
v ≥ v∗(θ). In other words, Theorem 2 says that when the agent draws a high type, she receives both
the efficient provision of the good today and in all subsequent periods, irrespective of whether she
draws a high or low type in those periods. Therefore, I interpret setting w∗(θH ; s) = v∗(θH) as the
principal vesting the agent – i.e., the principal-agent relationship is now as if the agent is a partner in
the principal’s firm. Notice, however, that this is not identical to selling the firm to the agent, as v∗(θH)
is less than the value of the firm.
It is important to contrast this result against the case of i.i.d. types, from Krishna et al. (2013).
In that case, the principal can actually sell the firm to both of the agent’s type. The schism between
Krishna et al. (2013) and my result stems from the persistence in types: When private information is
i.i.d., the principal always knows the expected present discounted value of the firm. This is not the
case when types are persistent, since the value will always depend on last period’s type realization, of
which the agent has incentives to potentially misreport.
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1.4.2 With the Liquidity Constraint
I now turn to preliminary results concerning the optimal maximal rent contract when the liquidity
constraint is present. Before solving for the optimal contract, I first simplify the constraints. Through-
out this section, I ignore the upward (IC) constraint. At the end of Section 1.5, I provide a parametric
restriction that insures that the optimal contract does not violate the upward (IC) constraint.
My first result concerns the relationship between w and wˆ – in particular, I am able to restrict
attention to wˆ(θH ; s) ≤ w(θH ; s) and wˆ(θL; s) ≥ w(θL; s). To understand this, first observe that
agents whose true type is θH are more valuable to the principal – high types generate more surplus
today and more expected surplus tomorrow, since type’s are positively autocorrleated. So in this
regard, agents with true type θH should receive larger promises of lifetime utility than agents with true
type θL. Now, in an incentive compatible contract, w(θ; s) is intended for agents whose true type is θ,
and wˆ(θ; s) for agents whose true type is θ˜. By this logic, the principal wants w(θH ; s) ≥ wˆ(θH ; s),
since w(θH ; s) is designed for the high type and wˆ(θH ; s) for the low type who misreports as a high.
Similarly, wˆ(θL; s) ≥ w(θL; s), since w(θL; s) is designed for the low type and wˆ(θL; s) for the high
type who misreports as a low. Lemma 2 formalizes this.
Lemma 2.
W ∗(θ) =
(w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s)) ∈ (0, v∗(θ)]× (0, vˆ∗(θ)] :
w(θH ; s) ≥ wˆ(θH ; s)
wˆ(θL; s) ≥ w(θL; s)
 ∪ (0, 0)
Lemma 2 provides a characterization of W ∗(θ), which is visualized in Figure 1.1. I compute
v∗(θ) and vˆ∗(θ) in the next section with Proposition 3. One important note about W ∗(θ) – (v, 0) and
(0, vˆ), for v, vˆ > 0, are not in W ∗(θ). This is a direct consequence of (PK) and (TK). In fact, if
(v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ) and v = 0, then it must be the case that vˆ = 0, and vice versa.
There are several immediate consequences from Lemma 2. First, I demonstrate that it is without
loss of generality for the downward (IC) to bind in the optimal contract. Second, to explore further
implications of Lemma 2, let
U(θ; s) ≡ u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s).
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Figure 1.1: W ∗(θ)
vˆ∗(θH)
v∗(θH)
W ∗(θH)
vˆ∗(θL)
v∗(θL)
W ∗(θL)
From Lemma 2, it follows that U(θH ; s) ≥ U(θL; s). In words, utility – the sum of instantaneous rents
and discounted promised utility – is weakly increasing in θ. This result is rather intuitive: Since high
types generate more instantaneous and future surplus, their total utility must be greater in an optimal
contract. However, it is worth noting that this result will still hold even if θ− = θL. That is, even if
there is a great likelihood of drawing θL this period, high types still require a greater net utility in an
optimal contract. I collect these two results with the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. In an optimal maximal rent contract,
1. The downward (IC) binds.
2. For any (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−), U(θH ; s) ≥ v ≥ U(θL; s) and U(θH ; s) ≥ vˆ ≥ U(θL; s).
Notice that part two of Lemma 3 says even more than the text preceding the statement of the
Lemma. Indeed U(θH ; s) ≥ U(θL; s), but the Lemma says more. In particular, the difference in the
net utility of each type is affected by the state (θ−, v, vˆ). When θ− = θH , this implies that v ≥ vˆ.
And if v is significantly larger than vˆ, Lemma 3 says that U(θH ; s)− U(θL; s) is proportionally large;
specifically, U(θH ; s)−U(θL; s) ≥ v− vˆ. On the other hand, when θ− = θL, this implies that vˆ ≥ v. In
this case, Lemma 3 places much less restrictions on the difference U(θH ; s)−U(θL; s). Consequently,
there is generally more downward pressure on U(θL; s) following a report of a high type in the previous
period than a low-type report.
Moving forward, in order to solve for the optimal liquidity constrained contract, I seek to reduce the
constraint set even further. Thus far, I have characterized W ∗(θ) and demonstrated that the downward
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(IC) binds. The next step is to trim (PK), (TK), and (IC) down into four equations, which I state in
Lemma 4. And, with these equations, I am able to rewrite (LI), which I do in Lemma 5.
Lemma 4. A contract b satisfies (PK), (TK), and (IC) if and only if it satisfies the following equations
for each s = (θ−, v, vˆ)
U(θL; s) = v − f(θH |θ−) [∆q(θL; s) + δ(wˆ(θL; s)− w(θL; s))] (UL)
U(θL; s) = vˆ − f(θH |θˆ−) [∆q(θL; s) + δ(wˆ(θL; s)− w(θL; s))] (UˆL)
U(θH ; s) = v + f(θL|θ−) [∆q(θL; s) + δ(wˆ(θL; s)− w(θL; s))] (UH)
U(θH ; s) = vˆ + f(θL|θˆ−) [∆q(θL; s) + δ(wˆ(θL; s)− w(θL; s))] (UˆH)
The proof of the proceeding Lemma is just a straightforward computation using the (PK), (TK),
and (IC) constraints. Lemma 4 provides a simple interpretation of rents in the constrained contract.
When an agent reports θL, according to U(θL; s) there are two components to her rent – what she
receives today, u(θL; s), and what she is owed tomorrow, δw(θL; s). By (UL), this is equal to v less
f(θH |θ−) times the high type’s information rent, which is ∆q(θL; s) + δ(wˆ(θL; s)− w(θL; s)).
To understand why this is the high type’s information rent, consider its two components separately.
The term ∆q(θL; s) is the standard static rent a high type would receive from misreporting her type,
whereas the second term, δ(wˆ(θL; s) − w(θL; s)), is the dynamic information rent. As the difference
between continuation values, the dynamic information rent captures the future rents gained by a high
type that misreports as a low type. This gain stems from the misalignment between the true distribution
of types next period and the principal’s beliefs about these types – i.e. f(θ|θL) versus f(θ|θH). By
Lemma 2, this dynamic information rent is positive. In total, the entire information rent is the sum
between these two components.
Similarly, when an agent reports θH , her net utility is U(θH ; s), which according to (UH), is v
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plus f(θL|θ−) times her information rent. As well, these equations highlight the role of (TK) in the
constrained contract. An optimal contract must be able to deliver the appropriate utility on path – (UL)
and (UH) – as well as off path – (UˆL) and (UˆH).
With these equations, I rewrite the (LI) constraints to the following, which provides a much simpler
characterization of the constraint set.
Lemma 5. A contract b satisfies (PK), (TK), (IC), and (LI) if and only if it satisfies, for each s =
(θ−, v, vˆ), the following inequalities
v − δw(θL; s)− f(θH |θ−) [∆q(θL; s) + δ(wˆ(θL; s)− w(θL; s))] ≥ 0 (L(θL; s))
vˆ − δw(θL; s)− f(θH |θˆ−) [∆q(θL; s) + δ(wˆ(θL; s)− w(θL; s))] ≥ 0 (Lˆ(θL; s)
v − δw(θH ; s) + f(θL|θ−) [∆q(θL; s) + δ(wˆ(θL; s)− w(θL; s))] ≥ 0 (L(θH ; s))
vˆ − δw(θH ; s) + f(θL|θˆ−) [∆q(θL; s) + δ(wˆ(θL; s)− w(θL; s))] ≥ 0 (Lˆ(θH ; s))
As a result of Lemma 5, I reduce the set of constraints down to (L(θL; s)), (Lˆ(θL; s), (L(θH ; s)),
(Lˆ(θH ; s)), q(θ; s) ≥ 0, and (w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s) ∈ W ∗(θ). Moreover, due to Lemma 1, I know exactly
when the constraints in Lemma 5 will bind – i.e., when w(θ; s) < v∗(θ). Notice that, for instance, if
(L(θL; s)) is slack, then (Lˆ(θL; s) must also be slack. This is due to the fact that (UL) and (UˆL) require
these two constraints to be equal. Now, with Lemma 5 in hand, I present a truncated program, which
is given in the following Proposition.
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Proposition 1. The principal’s problem (PR) is equivalent to the following solving the following pro-
gram for each s = (θ−, v, vˆ)
P (v, vˆ, θ−) = max
q,w,wˆ
∑
θ
f(θ|θ−) [θq(θ; s)− c(q(θ; s)) + δw(θ; s) + δP (w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s), θ)]− v
subject to (L(θL; s)), (Lˆ(θL; s), (L(θH ; s)), (Lˆ(θH ; s)),
q(θH ; s) ≥ q(θL; s) ≥ 0, and w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s) ∈ W ∗(θ)
(PR’)
Moreover, the optimal contract is continuous in (v, vˆ).
Proposition 1 reduces the principal’s problem of finding (u, q, w, wˆ) subject to (PK), (TK), (IC),
(LI), and feasibility to one of solving for (q, w, wˆ) subject to (L(θL; s)), (Lˆ(θL; s), (L(θH ; s)), (Lˆ(θH ; s)),
and feasibility – a considerably simpler problem. The final part of Proposition 1, that the optimal con-
tract is continuous in (v, vˆ), follows directly from Stokey, Lucas Jr, and Prescott (1989).
1.5 Optimal Contract
For any (v, vˆ, θ−), the optimal contract (q(θ−, v, vˆ), w(θ−, v, vˆ), wˆ(θ−, v, vˆ), ) is the solution to a
concave programming problem, and thus the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient. Let
γ(θ; s) be the Lagrange multiplier for the constraints (L(θL; s)) and (L(θH ; s)), and let γˆ(θ; s) be the
Lagrange multiplier for the constraints (Lˆ(θL; s) and (Lˆ(θH ; s)). As well, define Γ(s) ≡ γ(θH ; s) +
γ(θL; s) and Γˆ(s) ≡ γˆ(θH ; s) + γˆ(θL; s). Finally, let P1(v, vˆ, θ−) and P2(v, vˆ, θ−) be the partial
derivatives of P in its first and second arguments, respectively, evaluated at (v, vˆ, θ−).
In taking the first order conditions, I ignore the feasibility constraints in (PR’), and then later verify
that they are indeed satisfied. In addition, I implicitly assume that the implementability condition
(w(θ), wˆ(θ)) ∈ W ∗(θ) is satisfied. First, I have the first order conditions for q(θ; s).
c′(q∗(θH ; s)) = θH ; (FOCqH )
19
c′(q∗(θL; s)) = θL − θH − θL
f(θL|θ−) [γ
∗(θL; s)− f(θL|θ−)Γ∗(s)
+ γˆ∗(θL; s)− f(θL|θˆ−)Γˆ∗(s)
]
.
(FOCqL)
From these first order conditions, it is immediate that at least a portion of generalized no distor-
tion at the top property is preserved even with the liquidity constraint. In other words, q∗(θH ; s) =
qFB(θH). As well, q∗(θL; s) is distorted away from first-best, and in fact I can show that this distortion
is downward. Moreover, the distortion is intimately connected to the liquidity constraint. In particular,
if the liquidity constraint is slack, then q∗(θL; s) = qFB(θL). Next, consider the first order conditions
for w and wˆ.
P1(w
∗(θH ; s), wˆ∗(θH ; s), θH) = −1 + γ
∗(θH ; s) + γˆ∗(θH ; s)
f(θH |θ−) ; (FOCwH )
P1(w
∗(θL; s), wˆ∗(θL; s), θL) = −1 + 1
f(θL|θ−) [f(θL|θ−)Γ
∗(s)
+ f(θL|θˆ−)Γˆ∗(s)
]
;
(FOCwL)
P2(w
∗(θH ; s), wˆ∗(θH ; s), θH) = 0; (FOCwˆH )
P2(w
∗(θL; s), wˆ∗(θL; s), θL) =
1
f(θL|θ−) [γ
∗(θL; s)− f(θL|θ−)Γ∗(s)
+ γˆ∗(θL; s)− f(θL|θˆ−)Γˆ∗(s)
]
.
(FOCwˆL)
Observe that P1(w∗(θH), wˆ∗(θH), θH) ≥ −1, and strictly great than −1 if either γ∗(θH , θ−) or
γ∗(θH , θˆ−) are positive. In other words, if the liquidity constraint for the high type binds, then
P1(w
∗(θH), wˆ∗(θH), θH) > −1, which implies that w∗(θH ; s) ≤ v∗(θH). That is, in certain states,
the high type’s liquidity constraint precludes the principal from choosing the maximal promise.
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According to (FOCwˆH ), P2(w
∗(θH ; s), wˆ∗(θH ; s), θH) = 0. To understand this condition, recall
that for any choice of w(θH ; s) there is a set of implementable wˆ(θH ; s). (FOCwˆH ) says that wˆ
∗(θH ; s)
is chosen to maximize P (., ., θH), given w∗(θH ; s). From Lemma 2, w∗(θH ; s) ≥ wˆ∗(θH ; s), so be-
cause P (., ., θH) is weakly increasing in its second argument, it must be the case that wˆ∗(θH ; s) =
min {vˆ∗(θH), w∗(θH ; s)}. By contrast, P2(w∗(θL), wˆ∗(θL), θL) is proportional to the distortion for
q∗(θL; s), and positive so long as q∗(θL; s) < qFB(θL). In other words, incentive concerns require the
principal to distort wˆ∗(θL; s) away from the maximal choice.
Finally, the envelope conditions are
P1(v, vˆ, θ−) = −1 + Γ∗(s); (ENV)
P2(v, vˆ, θ−) = Γˆ∗(s). (ÊNV)
In (ENV ), if v < v∗(θ−), then Γ∗(s) > 0. Consequently, from (FOCwL), w
∗(θL; s) ≤ v∗(θL) as long
as v < v∗(θ−). Secondly, Γˆ∗(s) ≥ 0 by definition, so from (ÊNV), P2(v, vˆ, θ−) ≥ 0 for all (v, vˆ, θ−).
Therefore, by (FOCwˆL) and (FOCqL), I can conclude that q
∗(θL; s) ≤ qFB(θL). I collect a few of
these key properties of the optimal liquidity constrained contract in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. In an optimal liquidity constrained contract, the following is true
1. q∗(θH ; s) = qFB(θH);
2. q∗(θL; s) ≤ qFB(θL);
3. w∗(θH ; s) ≤ v∗(θH);
4. w∗(θL; s) ≤ v∗(θL);
5. If w∗(θL; s) = v∗(θL), then
q∗(θL; s) = qFB(θL) and w∗(θH ; s) = v∗(θH);
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6. If w∗(θH ; s) = v∗(θH), then
q∗(θL; θH , v∗(θH), vˆ∗(θH)) = qFB(θL) and w∗(θL; θH , v∗(θH), vˆ∗(θH)) = w∗(θL).
Parts one and two of Proposition 2 summarizes several properties that are familiar from static
agency theory – the high type receives the efficient provision of the good, and the low type receives
a downward distortion away from first-best. In parts three and four, Proposition 2 guarantees that
w∗(θ; s) ≤ v∗(θ), which is required in a maximal rent contract. Finally, parts five and six of Propo-
sition 2 provide some implications of setting w∗(θ; s) = v∗(θ). Specifically, if w∗(θL; s) = v∗(θL),
then it must be the case that w∗(θH ; s) = v∗(θH) and that the low type is receiving first-best quantity.
On the other hand, w∗(θH ; s) = v∗(θH) guarantees that next period w∗(θL; s′) = v∗(θL) and first-best
quantity for the low type. As was the case in Section 1.4.1, by setting w∗(θ; s) = v∗(θ), the principal
is is vesting the agent in the firm. Parts five and six of Proposition 2 highlight some of the differences
between v∗(θL) and v∗(θH), saying that if the low type agent is vested then so is the high type; how-
ever, it can be the case that the high type is vested, but the low type is not. I return to this distinction
in the next section.
With no liquidity constraint, Theorem 2 details exactly when this vesting occurs – when the agent
draws a high types – and whether the low type receive the first-best provision of the good. How-
ever, with a liquidity constraint, Proposition 2 does not fully characterize when w∗(θ; s) = v∗(θ) or
q∗(θL; s) = qFB(θL). In Section 1.6, through Proposition 5 and simulations, I explore when both of
these properties occur.
There is another related difference between Theorem 2 and Proposition 2. Theorem 2 is merely
the Generalized No Distortion at the Top property from Battaglini (2005). In Proposition 2, when the
agent reports a high type, she receives the efficient provision of the good today; however, Proposition 2
says nothing about the allocative efficiency of the optimal contract in the periods after the agent reports
a high type. In particular, it may be the case that w(θ; θH , v, vˆ) < v∗(θ).
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Before proceeding, I finish the characterization of the optimal contract by calculating
(v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ)),
determining the optimal contract at (v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ)), and stating when the upward (IC) constraint holds.
I obtain the first result by noticing that (L(θL; s)) and (Lˆ(θL; s) must still bind when the state is
(θ, v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ)), which stems from the continuity of the optimal contract.
Proposition 3. In an optimal maximal rent contract, the thresholds are given by
(v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ)) =
(
χ(θ)∆qFB(θL)
1− δ ,
χ(θˆ)∆qFB(θL)
1− δ
)
,
where θˆ 6= θ and
χ(θ) =
δf(θH |θL) + (1− δ)f(θH |θ)
1− δρ .
From Proposition 3, v∗(θH) = vˆ∗(θL) and v∗(θL) = vˆ∗(θH). Moreover, since χ(θH) ≥ χ(θL),
v∗(θH) ≥ vˆ∗(θH) > 0, so therefore (v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ)) ∈ W ∗(θ) for each θ and v∗(θH) ≥ v∗(θL).
To understand Proposition 3, notice that ∆q
FB(θL)
1−δ is the present discounted value of receiving the
high type’s first best information rent in perpetuity. Therefore v∗(θ) is merely this present discounted
value scaled by the factor χ(θ). When types are i.i.d., f(θH |θH) = f(θH |θL) = f(θH) and ρ = 0. This
implies that χ(θ) = f(θH), and therefore v∗(θL) = v∗(θH) =
f(θH)∆q
FB(θL)
1−δ , which is the threshold
found in Krishna et al. (2013). In the i.i.d. case, the interpretation for this value is that the principal
will vest the high type when the state reaches v∗(θ), and in all subsequent periods the high type will
receive first-best information rents.
On the other hand, when types are persistent, χ(θ) is no longer equal to the probability of drawing a
high type. In fact, as the degree of persistence ρ increases, v∗(θ) is distorted away from f(θH)∆q
FB(θL)
1−δ .
Whether this distortion is upward or downward depends on whether f(θH |θH) increased or f(θH |θL)
decreased. For instance, if I fix f(θH |θL) and increase f(θH |θH), χ(θ) is increasing. Hence persis-
tence increasing in this specific way yields a greater v∗(θ) from the i.i.d. case. All other changes in
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persistence result in ambiguous effects on v∗(θ).
With the equations for (v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ)) given in Proposition 3, I can now calculate the optimal con-
tract at the state (θ−, v∗(θ−), vˆ∗(θ−)). This is summarized in the following Corollary, which is obtained
by a simple computation using (PK) and (TK).
Corollary 1. When (θ−, v, vˆ) = (θ−, v∗(θ−), vˆ∗(θ−)), the optimal maximal rent contract is
1. q∗(θ; s) = qFB(θ),;
2. u∗(θH) = ∆qFB(θL), u∗(θL) = 0;
3. w∗(θ; s) = v∗(θ);
4. And wˆ∗(θ; s) = vˆ∗(θ).
At the vesting level (v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ)), the state of the optimal maximal rent contract oscillates between
(θH , v
∗(θH), v∗(θL)) and (θL, v∗(θL), v∗(θH)). And, at this level, incentive concerns fully dissipate –
both types receive the efficient allocation of the good and the high type receives instantaneous rents
∆qFB(θL). That is, once the state reaches the vesting level, the optimal maximal rent contract is as
if the agent is a part of the firm now. Notice that ∆qFB(θL) is the static information rent of first-best
production, and therefore the maximal rent the agent can achieve. The agent reaches this level of
information rents in part due to the restriction to maximal rent contracts. If I allowed for w∗(θ; s) >
v∗(θ), then the agent may never receive this maximal rent of ∆qFB(θL).
Finally, I present a condition on the parameters of the model that insure that the upward (IC)
constraint is not violated in an optimal contract.
Proposition 4. If (c′)−1(θL) ≤ (1− δρ)(c′)−1(θH), then the upward incentive compatibility constraint
is satisfied in an optimal contract.
This condition, while not immediately intuitive, is satisfied under two simple conditions: (i) The
difference θH − θL is sufficiently large; and/or (ii), the derivative of the cost function is sufficiently
concave. If these conditions are satisfied, then the first-best provision of the good to the high type
is significantly large relative to the first-best provision of the good to the low type. Therefore, in an
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optimal contract, q∗(θH ; s) = qFB(θH) is large relative to q∗(θL; s) ≤ qFB(θL). As a result, either
the upward (IC) constraint is slack, or all other constraints, along with optimal conditions, imply the
upward (IC) constraint.
1.6 Properties of the Optimal Contract
In this section, I derive important properties of the optimal contract and present simulations of
the value function and optimal contract. I first state the main result of the section, which concerns
short-run properties of the optimal contract. Following this, I simulate the optimal contract under
certain parameters and then conclude this section with a note about long-run properties of the optimal
contract.
Recall from Battaglini (2005) that the optimal contract absent the liquidity constraint has the el-
egant property that following the report of a high type, both the high and low types will receive the
efficient provision of the good after all subsequent histories. Proposition 5 highlights that this is not
the case when the agent is liquidity constrained.
Proposition 5. In an optimal, maximal rent contract, the following is true
1. If v < v∗(θH), then q∗(θL; θ−, v, vˆ) < qFB(θL);
2. For each θ−, there exists v(θ−) < v∗(θH) such that when (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−) with v < v(θ−), then
w∗(θH ; θ−, v, vˆ) < v∗(θH).
The first part of Proposition 5 says that an agent who reports a low type will only receive the
efficient provision of the good if v = v∗(θH). The intuition is as such: In Battaglini (2005), when the
agent reports a high type, the principal is then able to extract all future information rents by charging
a very large transfer. As a result, in all subsequent histories, there is no tension between incentives
and efficiency, and thus it is optimal to set q∗(θL; s) = qFB(θL) for all s. However, in my model, for
v < v∗(θH), the principal is restricted from pricing out rents by the agent’s binding liquidity constraint,
and thus incentive concerns may linger beyond the revelation of a high type. Therefore the optimal
contract must be chosen with incentives in mind when v < v∗(θH). And since the principal cannot
lower u∗(θ; s) any further, the burden of incentivization must fall on q∗(θ; s), w∗(θ; s), and wˆ∗(θ; s).
Part one of Proposition 5 says that the optimal mix of incentives involves a strictly downward distortion
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Table 1.2: Parameters
#1 #2 #3
θH 1.50 1.50 2.50 2.50
θL 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
f(θH |θH) 0.50 0.75 0.50 Varies
f(θH |θL) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
δ 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
vˆ∗(θH) 3.28 4.76 6.56 Varies
v∗(θH) 3.44 5.24 6.89 Varies
in q∗(θL; s).
The second part of Proposition 5 says for which v the liquidity constraint precludes the principal
from vesting the high type. In particular, the result establishes that there exists some threshold such
that if v is below this threshold, then w(∗θH ; s) < v∗(θH). Observe that if ρ > 0, then in an optimal
maximal rent contract w∗(θL; s) ≤ v∗(θL) < v∗(θH). In other words, part two of Proposition 5
implies that for v sufficiently low, w∗(θ; s) < v∗(θH) for each θ. Therefore, the state tomorrow will
be below v∗(θH). The intuition for this part of the proposition follows similarly to the first part. Since
the liquidity constraint binds, the principal cannot lower u∗(θ; s). Consequently, when v < v(θ−),
incentives dictate that not only q∗(θL; s) be distorted, but also w∗(θH ; s).
Altogether, Proposition 5 not only differentiates my results from Battaglini (2005), but it details
the stark nature of the optimal liquidity constrained contract. For any v < v∗(θH), the optimal contract
will be inefficient. In addition, if v < v(θ−), then the contract will be inefficient for at least two
periods.
1.6.1 Simulations
In this section I present simulations. I assume that c(q) = q
2
2
and consider four different parameter-
izations, which yields the values for (v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ)).8 These parametrization are summarized in Table
1.2. With each parametrization, the condition for Proposition 4 is satisfied. In each case, I calculate
the value function P (v, vˆ, θ−) and policy functions w∗(θ; s), wˆ∗(θ; s), and q∗(θ; s) by iterating the
value function over a 100x100 grid. I optimize over all (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−) in the grid, and simulate a
8Technically, I need to also assume that limq→0 c′(q) = −∞. This is needed to insure that the (v, vˆ) is always interior.
To avoid this issue, I bound (v, vˆ) away from (0, 0) in my simulations.
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semi-random path for {θt}Tt=1 for each parametrization. I examine three different initial states in each
simulation. For the first three simulations, I present the path of the state v on the left and the path of
q∗(θL; s) on the right. The fourth simulation present the path of v for two different ρ.
In the first simulation shown in Figure 1.2, I consider a draw of {θt}Tt=1 with T = 100 and initial
states of v0 = 0.41, v0 = 0.62, and v0 = 0.97. The path of v is increasing in the initial state v0, and
all three paths reach v∗(θH) by t = 79. At this point, the state oscillates between v∗(θH) when a high
type is drawn and v∗(θL) when a low type is drawn. q∗(θL; s) follows a similar path – increasing when
θ = θH and decreasing when θ = θL. Moreover, for all initial states q∗(θL; s) reaches qFB(θL) = 0.50
at t = 79 and remains at first-best indefinitely.
Figure 1.2: Simulation #1
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In the second simulation charted in Figure 1.3, I set f(θH |θH) = 0.75 and keep all other parameters
identical to the first simulation. I plot the path of the state v along the optimal contract and the path
of q∗(θL; s). I draw {θt}Tt=1 with T = 250 and consider initial states of v0 = 0.80, v0 = 1.35, and
v0 = 1.90. Due to the increased persistence in this simulation, the path of v takes longer to reach
v∗(θH), with all three paths reaching v∗(θH) by t = 204. As was the case in the first simulations,
q∗(θL; s) follows a similar trajectory as v.
With the third simulation (Figure 1.4), I revert back to f(θH |θH) = 0.50, but now set θH = 2.50
I draw {θt}Tt=1 with T = 500, and plot the path of the state v and q∗(θL; s) for three different initial
states – v0 = 0.96, v0 = 1.70, and v0 = 2.43. Due to the larger θH , the principal must counteract this
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Figure 1.3: Simulation #2
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
t
v
Path of Promised Rents
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
0
5 · 10−2
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
t
q
Path of Quantity for Low Type
increase in the high type’s static information rent ∆q∗(θL; s) by choosing low w∗(θL; s). As a result,
for initial state v0 = 0.96 the contract took t > 500 periods to reach v∗(θH). Lastly, this simulation
illustrates that if the state v is sufficiently low, then even after multiple consecutive high type reports,
the optimal contract can still call for an inefficient provision of the good to the low type.
Figure 1.4: Simulation #3
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
t
v
Path of Promised Rents
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
5 · 10−2
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
t
q
Path of Quantity for Low Type
With the fourth simulation, I highlight the difference between this chapter’s persistent environment
and i.i.d. private information, like in Krishna et al. (2013). Graphed in Figure 1.5 are two different
simulations of the path of the state variable v. On the left, I draw a new path {θt}Tt=1 with T = 300
and use the same parameters and initial states as the third simulation. On the right, the parameters are
the same as the leftward simulation except f(θH |θH) = .25000001 to capture ρ → 0. I use the same
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path of θt for the rightward simulation and the initial states are drawn from the same percentiles as
the leftward simulation. The difference between these two simulations is drastic. With significantly
positive persistence, only the path corresponding to the greatest initial state v0 = 2.43 reaches v∗(θH)
by T = 300. By contrast, as ρ→ 0, all three paths reach v∗(θH) by t = 56.
Figure 1.5: Simulation #4
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Path of v when ρ = 0.25
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This result stems from the choice of w∗(θL; s) in each case. When types are persistent, drawing a
low type not only yields lower surplus today, but also increases the likelihood of drawing a low type
tomorrow. As ρ→ 0, drawing a low type has almost no effect on tomorrow’s type, and this suppresses
the negative consequences of drawing θL. Therefore, the promise w∗(θL; s) is relatively lower when
ρ > 0 to when ρ→ 0.
More formally, recall from Lemma 3 that U(θH ; s) ≥ v ≥ U(θL; s) and U(θH ; s) ≥ vˆ ≥ U(θL; s).
When all of the liquidity constraints bind, it can be shown that Lemma 3 implies that w(θH ; s) > vδ >
w(θL; s) and w(θH ; s) > vˆδ > w(θL; s). Following the report of a high type in the previous period,
v ≥ vˆ, and hence the aforementioned strict inequalities place downward pressure on w(θL; s).
In the Appendix, I place bounds on |v− vˆ| for (v, vˆ) implementable in an optimal contract, and the
tightness of these bounds is proportional to ρ. In particular, when ρ → 0, v = vˆ. Therefore, given v
and θ− = θH , the upper bound on w∗(θL; s) is lower when ρ > 0 than when ρ → 0. In other words,
following a high-type report the previous period, low types potentially face smaller promises today
when private information is persistent than in the case of i.i.d. private information.
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1.6.2 Long-Run Properties
I now turn to a brief discussion of the long-run properties of the optimal contract. An important
question in dynamic contracting problems like this chapter is whether the contract is efficient in the
limit. Within the context of this model, that question is tantamount to asking whether the state v con-
verges to v∗(θH) in the long-run. Traditionally, in i.i.d. environments like Thomas and Worrall (1990)
and Krishna et al. (2013), it can be shown that the derivative of the value function is a martingale.
As a result, one can argue that this derivative converges to −1 along all possible sample paths. This
implies that the state must converge to the social surplus maximizing value, and therefore the contract
is efficient in the probabilistic limit.
There exists an analogous martingale in the Markovian framework of this chapter. However, dis-
cussing its limit properties is extremely difficult with Markovian private information. I defer interested
readers to Fu and Krishna (2015), who identify the relevant martingale in their similar model, charac-
terize its limit properties, and therefore discuss the long-run properties of their optimal contract.
1.7 Generalized Liquidity Constraint
In this section, I generalize (LI) and examine the consequences of this extension. I present the
main result in this section, and relegate some of the technical details to the Appendix. Now, to extend
my problem, I first must consider a more general contract b : Θ2 × R2+ → {0, 1} × R4+, where
b(θ; s) = (x(θ; s), q(θ; s), u(θ; s), w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s)) .
In this contract, q(θ; s), u(θ; s), w(θ; s), and wˆ(θ; s) maintain their interpretations from previous sec-
tions, and x(θ; s) ∈ {0, 1} is the inclusion decision for an agent who reports θ when the state is s.
When x(θ; s) = 1, the principal must deliver service to the agent subject to a set constraints. If instead
x(θ; s) = 0, then the agent is excluded from participating in the contract this period, but still may
receive promises of future utility.
This new contract is subject to a set of constraints, which I now present.
Generalized Promise Keeping. The Promise Keeping constraint requires that the contract satisfy for
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all s = (θ−, v, vˆ)
v =
∑
θ=θH ,θL
f(θ|θ−) (x(θ; s)u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s)) . (PK’)
Generalized Threat Keeping. The Threat Keeping constraint requires that the contract satisfy, for
all s = (θ−, v, vˆ) and θˆ− 6= θ−
vˆ =
∑
θ=θH ,θL
f(θ|θˆ−) (x(θ; s)u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s)) . (TK’)
(PK’) and (TK’) are very similar to their original forms, except these new constraints account
for the agent’s new flow payoff x(θ; s)u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s). With these constraints, the principal is
still obligated to deliver v and vˆ, but may now do so by setting x(θ; s) = 0 and choosing w(θ; s)
appropriately.
Generelized Incentive Compatibility. The Incentive Compatibility constraint requires that the con-
tract satisfy, for all θ, θ˜ and s = (θ−, v, vˆ)
x(θ; s)u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s) ≥ x(θ˜; s)u(θ˜; s) + δwˆ(θ˜; s) + (θ − θ˜)q(θ˜; s). (IC’)
As is the case with (PK’) and (TK’), (IC’) is a slight adaptation of (IC) to encapsulate the change
in the agent’s flow payoff.
Generalized Liquidity. The Liquidity constraint requires that the contract satisfy, for all θ and s =
(θ−, v, vˆ), if x(θ; s) = 1, then
u(θ; s) ≥ `, (LI’)
for ` ∈ R.
With (LI’), the principal must now guarantee at least ` instantaneous surplus when x(θ; s) = 1,
where ` ∈ R. Notice that the constraint (LI) covers the case when ` = 0.
Generalized Feasibility. The Feasibility constraint requires that the contract satisfy, for all θ and
s = (θ−, v, vˆ), if x(θ; s) = 1, then
q(θ; s) ≥ 0. (FE’)
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Feasibility merely requires that quantity be non-negative for each type and state, so long as x(θ; s) =
1. Now, let W˜ ∗(θ−) ⊂ R2+ be the set of (v, vˆ) such that there exists a contract b that satisfies (PK’),
(TK’), (IC’), (FE’), and (LI’) under the state (θ−, v, vˆ).
Generalized Implementability. The Implementability constraint requires that the contract satisfy, for
all θ and s = (θ−, v, vˆ),
w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s) ∈ W ∗(θ). (IM’)
Just as was the case with (IM), (IM’) requires that the principal chooses w(θ; s) and wˆ(θ; s) such
that there exists a contract next period that satisfies all constraints when the state is
(θ, w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s)).
In what follows, I state the main result in this section. All preliminary results to Proposition 6
are stated in the Appendix – for instance the existence of a value function representing the principal’s
problem in this more general contract.
Proposition 6. There exists `∗ > 0 and `∗ < 0 such that
1. If ` ≥ `∗, then x∗(θ; s) = 0 for all θ and s;
2. If ` ≤ `∗, then the principal will vest the agent as soon as she reports herself to be a high type.
Proposition 6 provides considerable structure on the optimal contract for extreme `. In part one,
when ` is very large, the principal no longer finds it profitable to contract with the agent, and thus
sets x∗(θ; s) = 0 to avoid the provision of u∗(θ; s). However, because the agent is owed some util-
ity v, the principal cannot terminate the contract. Therefore, in order to satisfy (PK’), the princi-
pal chooses increasingly large w∗(θ; s).9 For example, consider ` = θHqFB(θH) − c(qFB(θH)) +
δP (v∗(θH), vˆ∗(θH), θH); i.e., ` is equal to the net surplus when the agent is vested. At this level,
the principal cannot extract any surplus from the agent, and thus there are no gains to trade for the
principal. As a result, it is optimal to set x∗(θ; s) = 0 in each period.
9To satisfy (PK’) and (TK’),w∗(θ; s)must be greater than v so long as v is positive. Clearly this implies thatw∗(θ; s)→
∞ so long the initial state v0 is positive.
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On the other hand, in part two, when ` is very low, the agent’s liquidity constraint will never bind,
and therefore the model is as if there is no liquidity constraint. Consequently, the optimal contract is
characterized by Theorem 2. To see this result, consider taking the limit as `→ −∞. As ` decreases,
the principal can extract more surplus from the agent in each period. Eventually |`| will exceed the
lifetime expected utility of the agent, and, at which point, the agent would reject any contract that
would call for the full extraction of |`|.
Of note, Proposition 6 incapsulates part of Battaglini (2005) and Guo and Ho¨rner (2015). When
` ≤ `∗, the model is as if there is no liquidity constraint, and my setting is then identical to Battaglini
(2005), where the principal claims all residual rents by extracting all surplus as soon as the agent
reveals herself to be a high type. On the other hand, when ` ≥ `∗, the principal desires to not trade
with any agent. This is part of a result found in Guo and Ho¨rner (2015), who demonstrate that one of
the absorbing points of their optimal contract is no trade.10
Although Proposition 6 characterizes the impact of extreme changes in liquidity, it says nothing
about the local properties of liquidity. For example, consider the marginal effect on the agent’s welfare
of increasing the liquidity constraint from ` = 0 to ` = , for  > 0 small. Results like Proposition 5
will remain intact after this change; however, untangling the net effect on the agent’s welfare is non-
trivial.
With this change in `, there are two effects at work: (i) For  sufficiently small, there are gains to
trade under this new liquidity constraint, and thus the agent is now receiving positive instantaneous
rents; and (ii), it is shown in the Appendix that v∗(θ) is increasing in `. Therefore, while an increase in
` results in u∗(θ; s) = ` > 0 each period, the threshold v∗(θ) for the agent receiving u∗(θ; s) > ` has
also increased. Consequently, (i) and (ii) may have countervailing impact on the agent’s welfare. Any
comparison of these two effects greatly depends on the time required to reach v∗(θ), which depends
on not only the initial state, but also the path of realized types θt. As such, it is currently ambiguous
whether the agent benefits from a marginal change in her liquidity constraint.
10Although Guo and Ho¨rner (2015) do no use transfers, they prove that their model is equivalent to one in which their
are transfers, but the privately informed party is protected by a sufficiently strong limited liability constraint.
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1.8 Conclusion
I examine a principal-agent model, where the principal is a monopolist selling a non-durable good
to an agent in each period. In this chapter, I characterize the optimal contract when time is discrete
and infinite, and the agent’s marginal valuation for the good evolves according to a Markov process.
I assume that the agent has finite funds, and is thus liquidity constrained. As a result, several novel
features emerge from the optimal contract, which is recursive and the solution to a concave dynamic
programming problem.
In contrast to Battaglini (2005), the optimal contract in this chapter exhibits short-run distortions
in the provision of the good even after the agent draws a high type. Like Battaglini (2005), I find that
the optimal contract calls for the efficient provision of the good to the agent’s high type; however, sub-
sequent low type draws by the agent may still receive an inefficient provision of the good. Specifically,
if the state is sufficiently low, then the provision of the good to the low type will be inefficient for at
least two periods.
My simulations suggest several comparative statics. First, increases in persistence and the static
information rent delay the time to reach v∗(θH). This occurs because increases in persistence and the
static information rent yield higher v∗(θH), cause more volatility in the path of v, and require more
consecutive high type draws before v can increase. Second, my simulations suggest vastly different
trajectories for v in an i.i.d. framework, as opposed to the persistent private information of this chapter.
Notably, low types are punished significantly more in terms of promised utility in the persistent model.
Finally, I consider a generalized model to accommodate variations in the strength of the liquidity
constraint. I demonstrate that when the agent is sufficiently liquid, my model replicates the results
found in Battaglini (2005). That is, the principal immediately vests the agent as soon as she reports
herself to be a high type. And, in doing so, the principal becomes the residual claimant on all informa-
tion rents. On the other hand, when the agent has no access to credit and must face a strong liquidity
constraint, my results resemble Guo and Ho¨rner (2015). In particular, I find that the optimal contract
under this parametrization is no trade.
Immediate future work entails two topics. First, I am seeking to further understand the role of the
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upward (IC) constraint in dynamic adverse selection. For instance, I am exploring whether Proposi-
tion 4 can be generalized to more parameters. Or, alternatively, if the conditions of Proposition 4 are
not satisfied, would the presence of the upward (IC) constraint affect the optimal contract. Second, I
am interested in estimating the local effects of liquidity in the optimal contract. As was discussed at the
end of Section 1.7, an analytic characterization of the effect of a marginal increase in ` is challenging.
However, incorporating the generalized liquidity constraint into my simulations may prove fruitful.
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CHAPTER 2
DYNAMIC CONTRACTING UNDER NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
2.1 Introduction
Consider a dynamic principal-agent setting where the principal is a monopolist who can commit
to long-term contracts with multiple agents. There are many real world instances of such interactions,
like university housing, country club memberships, and retirement communities. Each of these markets
have many important features, several of which are common across all three interactions. First, agents’
preferences stochastically change throughout the duration of the contract according to privately known
characteristics. And second, agents’ preferences are affected by each other’s private characteristics.
In order to better understand these features, restrict attention to the example of retirement commu-
nities. In this market, the firm is engaged in a dynamic relationship with its consumers, delivering a
service that is affected by the composition of the firm’s patrons. More specifically, one can interpret
a consumer’s private characteristic as their health level. And consumers who are in better health can
not only better appreciate the services offered by the firm, but they also can better interact with their
fellow residents. In other words, health exerts a network externality in this market.
To motivate this chapter, consider the specific example of Continuing Care Retirement Commu-
nities (CCRC), which comprise a large segment of the retirement community industry. The defining
characteristic of a CCRC is that they admit residents earlier on in retirement, while they are still in
good health (Zarem 2010). These firms provide a community for active seniors through condomini-
ums, dinning, and social events. And when a retiree falls upon poor health, the CCRC guarantees
access to nursing and medical care. Hence these firms engage in a repeated relationship with their
members, providing continued service and long-term benefits. As well, since so much of these com-
munities revolve around interactions between residents, who the CCRC admits is incredibly important.
That is, all else equal, residents prefer to interact with healthier individuals. As a result, when facing an
unhealthy prospective resident, the CCRC faces a tradeoff between rent extraction through including
the consumer and maximizing the average health of the community by excluding the consumer.
To capture this tension, I formally model this CCRC environment in an infinite horizon discrete-
time adverse selection setting with overlapping generations, where agents are patrons and prospective
patrons of the firm, and the principal is the owner of the firm. In this model, agents’ types evolve
according to an independent and identically distributed process that each agent privately observes,
where one can interpret an agent’s type as a myriad of private characteristics. The principal’s goal is
then to screen these agents through contracts that elicit truthful reports of agents’ types. Moreover,
agents exert a network externality upon each other. Specifically, each agent’s marginal valuation of
the principal’s good not only depends on their own type, but also the type of any other agent that is
currently contracting with the firm.
At her disposal, the principal can incentivize agents through both instantaneous and future promises
of rents. Importantly, as part of her instantaneous incentive scheme, the principal can choose to exclude
agents from participating in the contract for a period. And within this environment, one can think of
these promises as either equity in the club or future guarantees of service. The presence of these
future promises has two main purposes for the principal: (i) By promising future rents tomorrow, the
principal can extract more surplus today; and (ii) the principal has an additional way to incentivize
truthful reports from agents.
To ensure a non-trivial optimal contract, I assume that agents are liquidity constrained. In the
context of the CCRC example, this assumption is reasonable, as many residents live on a fixed income
and rely on social security. Absent this liquidity constraint, an agent could always purchase the firm
outright, which is the efficient outcome, as this resolves the issue of informational asymmetry for this
agent. As such, I assume that there is a limit to how much the firm can charge an agent in any given
period, and, as a result, agents must engage in multi-period contracts with the principal in order to
receive the firm’s service.
With this model specification, I characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a concave dy-
namic programming problem, where the state variable is future promised utility. I find that the optimal
provision of quality resembles the standard, static adverse selection model: there is no distortion away
from first-best for the high type, and the low type receives a quality that is distorted downward from
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first-best. Next, I find that incentives are provided through future promises of expected utility – low
types receive less continuation utility than high types. In fact, until an agent has accumulated a signifi-
cantly large promise of future utility, this is the sole way the principal provides information rents. That
is, there exists a threshold such that as long as promised future utility is below this level, then agents
receive no instantaneous rent. When an agent finally reaches this threshold, she receives first-best
quality indefinitely. In other words, rents are backloaded in the optimal contract.
All of the aforementioned results hold in dynamic environments without network effects. The
novel contributions of this paper are twofold: First, I provide monotonicity properties of the optimal
contract, demonstrating that both quality and future promises are increasing in the current promise. In
this regard, the contract is continuously increasing toward the first-best provision of quality. Second, I
characterize the exclusionary policy of the optimal contract, and demonstrate that the optimal contract
is biased in favor of older agents. This result stems in part from the monotonicity properties of the
optimal contract. It can be shown that the inclusion decision is also increasing in the state variable.
And if new agents are born at a sufficiently low initial wealth level, the principal may prefer to exclude
these agents for several periods.
In the next subsection, I review related literature. The results are divided into three subsections:
2.3.1 where I precisely define the model; 2.4.1 where I present preliminary results; and, 2.4.2 where I
characterize the optimal contract. I conclude in Section 2.5, where I discuss the results in the context
of the retirement community example and offer future avenues of work. All proofs are contained in
Appendix B.
2.2 Related Literature
This chapter belongs to two branches of literature – dynamic contracting and network externalities.
Within the former, this chapter follows in the spirit of Baron and Besanko (1984), who investigate
optimal regulation in a dynamic setting when the regulator can fully commit. This chapter adopts a
recursive approach to solve the contracting problem, which stems from the early work of Green (1987),
Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1988), and Thomas and Worrall (1990). Within this
literature, the contracting problem is solved by using promised future utility as a state variable, and
thus the optimal contract can be determined using techniques from dynamic programming.
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Much of this model comes from Krishna et al. (2013), who consider an infinite-horizon screening
problem, where an agent has private information about the cost structure of the principal’s firm. In
Krishna et al. (2013), the agent is liquidity constrained, and thus cannot purchase the firm from the
principal. Therefore, the two parties engage in a dynamic contracting problem with adverse selection.
Krishna et al. (2013) characterize the optimal contract under the interpretation of the state variable
as the agent’s equity in the firm. They explore the limit properties of the contract, and find that with
probability one, the agent will become a fully vested owner of the firm.
However, this chapter differs from Krishna et al. (2013) in several ways. I extend their single agent,
single principal model to an overlapping generation model with two agents who are linked through a
network externality. And many of the results of Krishna et al. (2013) carry over to this multi-agent,
externality environment. In addition, I discuss the monotonicity properties of the optimal contract,
and, as such, can investigate how the contract evolves with the state.
Of importance, this chapter restricts attention to i.i.d. types, and can adapt the well-known and
simple recursive structure of Thomas and Worrall (1990) to an OLG framework. However, recent work
on dynamic mechanism design and contracting has expanded to more general stochastic processes.
Fernandes and Phelan (2000), Kapicˇka (2013), Pavan et al. (2014), Guo and Ho¨rner (2015), and Fu
and Krishna (2015) for example, allow for persistence of types.
The other branch – network externalities – originates with Katz and Shapiro (1985), who intro-
duce the concept of a network externality and examine the effects of this externality on two competing
firms in a static environment. More recent work has explored the role of network externalities in a dy-
namic setting. For example, Driskill (2007), Cabral (2011), and Radner, Radunskaya, and Sundarara-
jan (2014) study the effects of network externalities in monopolistic and oligopolistic environments.
However, no recent work has managed to combine the study of network externalities with dynamic
contracting.
Lastly, this chapter’s utility formulation stems from Board (2009), who investigates the effects of
various network externality specifications on monopolistic pricing and sorting. Board (2009) finds
that under many externality specifications, a monopolist finds it optimal to fully segregate consumers
in order to extract more surplus from high type consumers. I adopt the average type externality from
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Board (2009)
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Contract Design
A long-lived principal contracts with a series of agents for the provision of quality in periods
t = 0, 1, 2, ... . All parties are risk neutral, have time-separable preferences, and share a common
discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). In period t, the principal can deliver idiosyncratic quality qt to each
consumer at price pt, and if a quality qt is agreed upon, then the principal will incur cost c(qt), where
c : R+ → R+ continuously differentiable and limq→0 c′(q) = −∞.
In each period, there are two agents available to contract with the principal – an old agent (i = o)
who was alive in the previous period, and a new agent (i = n) who was born at the beginning of the
current period. Each period, both the new agent and the old agent draw type θ ∈ {θL, θH} ≡ Θ ⊂ R+,
where 0 < θL < θH < ∞, and Pr(θ = θL) = fL > 0, Pr(θ = θH) = fH > 0. These draws are
i.i.d. across periods. At the end of each period, one agent dies, each with equal probability. I assume
that entering period t = 0, one agent is already alive. Thus I view the principal’s problem as twofold
– contracting with an old agent who has survived for one or more periods, and starting a new contract
with an agent who was just born that period.
An agent’s utility depends on not only her own type, but also on the type of the other agent contract-
ing with the principal. I assume that if agent i draws type θit in period t, she receives a marginal benefit
of quality equal to mi(θit, θ
−i
t , xt), where θ
−i
t is agent −i’s type, and xt is the inclusion decision. That
is, facing quality qt, an agent with type θit participating in the contract derives utility m
i(θit, θ
−i
t , xt)qt
from quality. Altogether, in period t, agent i receives instantaneous utility mi(θit, θ
−i
t , xt)qt − pt from
the contract this period.
In period t, the inclusion decision xt is a vector of probabilities over possible inclusion events.
Each period, there are four inclusion outcomes: include both agent n and o, whose probability is
represented as xbt ; include only agent n (x
n
t ); include only agent o (x
o
t ); and, exclude both agents (x
r
t ).
When an agent is excluded in a period, she receives zero marginal benefit from quality, but is not
excluded from future participation. If agent i is included, she receives a marginal benefit of quality
that is also a function of the inclusion decision for agent −i, as well as her type. Altogether, agent i
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receives marginal benefit of quality
mi(θit, θ
−i
t , xt) = x
b
tg
i(θit, θ
−i
t ) + x
i
th
i(θit),
where gi : Θi×Θ−i → R and hi : Θi → R are increasing in all of their arguments and hi(θ) = gi(θ, θ).
I make no additional assumptions about the functional forms of gi, but it is convenient to interpret gi
as the average θ.
In designing the optimal contract, I invoke the Revelation Principle, and restrict attention to in-
centive compatible direct mechanisms. Additionally, within this structure, I may use recursive mech-
anisms, where the state is an agent’s promised lifetime utility. More precisely, the state in period t is
the promised utility of the agent who survived the previous period. In other words, the current period’s
state is the promised lifetime utility of the old agent. Therefore, in each period, an agent’s total utility
is the sum of her instantaneous utility and tomorrow’s promised lifetime utility. I provide a detailed
statement of the Revelation Principle and a proof that this problem can be represented recursively in
the Appendix.
I take the convention that when an agent is born, she has lifetime expected utility v0 > 0, which I
interpret as the agent’s wealth prior to engaging in the contract. I denote the lifetime expected utility
of an old agent as v.1
A contract is b : Θ2 × R+×R+ → R2+×R2+×R2+×[0, 1]4, where
b(θ˜; v, v0) ≡
(
q(θ˜; v, v0), p(θ˜; v, v0), w(θ˜; v, v0), x(θ˜; v, v0)
)
,
and q(θ˜, v, v0) = (qn(θ˜, v, v0), qo(θ˜, v, v0)) is the quality vector,
p(θ˜, v, v0) = (p
n(θ˜, v, v0), p
o(θ˜, v, v0))
1I interpret v0 as the agent’s outside option, derived from the wealth level that agent has at the time of signing the
contract. As such, how v0 is determined is un-modeled, and it is taken as an exogenous parameter. It will become apparent
throughout this chapter that v and v0 play a symmetric role in determining the optimal contract, yet I want to reiterate that
v can evolve from period to period, but v0 cannot.
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is the transfer vector, w(θ˜, v, v0) = (wn(θ˜, v, v0), wo(θ˜, v, v0)) is the vector of promised lifetime utility
conditional on survival, and
x(θ˜, v, v0) = (x
b(θ˜, v, v0), x
o(θ˜, v, v0), x
n(θ˜, v, v0), x
r(θ˜, v, v0))
is the inclusion vector. Altogether, in an incentive compatible mechanism, given a truthful report of
(θi, θ−i), agent i receives utility
mi(θi, θ−i, x(θi, θ−i, v, v0))qi(θi, θ−i, v, v0)− pi(θi, θ−i, v, v0) + δwi(θi, θ−i, v, v0),
where δ = β
2
.
To clarify notation, for example, qi(θi, θ−i, v, v0) is the quality agent i receives from the contract
when she truthfully reports θi, agent −i truthfully reports θ−i, the state is v, and v0 given. I interpret
p, x, and w in a similar fashion.
It is convenient to define
ui(θi, θ−i, v, v0) ≡ mi(θi, θ−i, x(θi, θ−i, v, v0))qi(θi, θ−i, v, v0)− pi(θi, θ−i, v, v0),
which is the instantaneous rent agent i receives after a truthful report of (θi, θ−i). With this definition,
I consider contracts consisting of (u, q, x, w) instead of (p, q, x, w). Whenever it is obvious, I suppress
the dependency of contractual variables on v and v0. As well, unless otherwise stated, I take the
convention that θ = (θi, θ−i) ∈ Θ2.
2.3.2 Constraints
The optimal contract is subject to several constraints, which I now present.
Incentive compatibility. The Incentive Compatibility constraint requires that the contract satisfies
the following, for all θ = (θi, θ−i), θ˜ = (θ˜i, θ−i), and v
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E−i
[
ui(θ; v, v0) + δw
i(θ; v, v0)
] ≥E−i [ui(θ˜; v, v0) + δwi(θ˜; v, v0)
+M i(θi, θ˜i, θ−ix(θ˜; v, v0))qi(θ˜; v, v0)
]
,
(ICij)
for i = n, o, where M i(θi, θ˜i, θ−ix(θ˜; v, v0)) = mi(θ, x(θ˜; v, v0)) − mi(θ˜, x(θ˜; v, v0)) and E−i is the
expectation operator over the other agent’s type.
In words, agent i’s utility from truthfully reporting type θi must be greater than or equal to the utility
from misreporting as θ˜i, which equals the utility from truthfully reporting θ˜i plus an information rent.
To understand this information rent, notice that M i(θ, θ˜, x(θ˜; v, v0)) reflects the differences between
the marginal of quality when the true type is θi but the reported type is θ˜i and the marginal of quality
when the true and reported type are both θ˜i.
Promise Keeping. The Promise Keeping constraint requires that the contract satisfies the following,
for all v
En
∑
θo=θL,θH
f(θo) [uo(θo, θn; v, v0) + δw
o(θo, θn; v, v0)] = v, (PKo)
Eo
∑
θn=θL,θH
f(θn) [un(θn, θo; v, v0) + δw
n(θn, θo; v, v0)] = v0, (PKn)
where E is expectation operator over both the young and old agent’s type.
These constraints require that agents receive the utility promised to them (v or v0) in the form of
instantaneous utility (u) and promise utility in the next period (δw).
Liquidity. The Liquidity constraints requires that the contracts satisfies the following, for all v
E−i ui(θi, θ−i; v, v0) ≥ 0, (LI ij)
for i = n, o and all θi.
That is, when an agent truthfully reports her type as θi, she must receive nonnegative instantaneous
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expected rents. As is the case in Krishna et al. (2013), the (LI ij) constraint is the driving force behind
inefficiency in the optimal contract.
Feasibility. The Feasibility constraint requires that the contract satisfies the following, for all v
qi(θi, θ−i; v, v0) ≥ 0,
wi(θi, θ−i; v, v0) ≥ 0,∑
j=b,n,o,r
xj(θi, θ−i; v, v0) ≤ 1,
and x(θi, θ−i; v, v0) ∈ [0, 1]4
for i = n, o and all θi, θ−i.
Notice that these feasibility constraints, in addition to promise-keeping and liquidity, imply that
the agent receives nonnegative utility from participating in this contract, and therefore the contract is
individually rational.
Theorem 1. There exists a unique function P such that the principal’s program can be written as
follows
P (v) = max
b∈Γ(v;v0)
∑
i
Eθ
[
mi(θ, x(θ; v, v0))q
i(θ; v, v0)− c(qi(θ; v, v0))
−ui(θ; v, v0) + δP (wi(θ; v, v0))
]
,
(PR)
where Γ(v) is the set of contracts that satisfy Incentive Compatibility, Promise-Keeping, Liquidity, and
Feasibility. Moreover, P is concave, continuously differentiable, P ′(0) = ∞, and ∃v∗ ∈ [0,∞) such
that P ′(v) > −1 for all v < v∗ and P ′(v) = −1 for all v ≥ v∗.
Theorem 1 says that the firm is maximizing over (u, q, x, w), summing over both agents i = n
and i = o, and taking expectation over both agent’s types. The objective function is equal to the total
surplus from interaction,
mi(θ, x(θ; v, v0))q
i(θ; v, v0)− c(qi(θ; v, v0)),
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less instantaneous rents left to each agent, ui(θ; v, v0), plus tomorrow’s discounted value function,
δV (wi(θ; v, v0)). And the state of tomorrow’s value function is the promised future utility of the agent
that survived at the end of the period, wi(θ; v, v0).
Theorem 1 also provides some structure for the optimal contract. In particular, the optimal con-
tract is found by maximizing a continuously differentiable, concave function over a compact domain.
Therefore, by the Theorem of the Maximum, an optimal contract exits. Moreover, there exists some
v∗ such that the principal’s value function is increasing in promised utility for wi(θ; v, v0) < v∗, and
constant in promised utility for wi(θ; v, v0) ≥ v∗.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Preliminary Results
Before characterizing the optimal contract, I provide a series of results in order to simplify the prin-
cipal’s problem. The goal is to reduce the set of constraints that are relevant and to better understand
when each constraint actually binds. I begin with the following result.
Proposition 1. In an optimal contract, wi(θ; v, v0) < v∗ implies that E−i ui(θ; v, v0) = 0. Moreover,
in an optimal contract if E−i ui(θ; v, v0) > 0, then E−iwi(θ; v, v0) = v∗.
Proposition 1 immediately provides some intuition for the principal’s problem. As long as agent
i is promised less expected lifetime utility than v∗, then she will receive zero instantaneous expected
rents, and her liquidity constraint will bind. And, if an agent’s liquidity constraint does not bind, then
she is being promised v∗ next period.
Notice that if v = v∗, then wi(θ; v, v0) = v∗ for all θ, since social surplus is maximized at v∗.
And the only way Promise Keeping is satisfied is if E−i ui(θ; v, v0) > 0. Therefore, once v = v∗, the
liquidity constraints for agent i are no longer binding.
To further analyze the principal’s program, it is helpful to reformulate the problem by simplifying
the set of constraints that bind in an optimal contract. Consider, for instance, when the downward
incentive constraints bind for agents i = n, o
E−i
[
ui(θiH , θ
−i) + δwi(θiH , θ
−i)
]
=E−i
[
ui(θiL, θ
−i) + δwi(θiL, θ
−i)
+M i(θiH , θ
i
L, θ
−i, x(θiH , θ
−i))qi(θiH , θ
−i)
]
.
(Ci)
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As is the case in static adverse selection, if quality is monotonic in type, then these downward con-
straints are the only incentive constraints that bind in an optimal contract. More precisely,
Definition 1. Quality for agent i is monotonic in type if, for each v,
E−i qi(θiH , θ−i; v, v0) ≥ E−i qi(θiL, θ−i; v, v0). (MON iq)
Similarly, the inclusion decision for agent i is monotonic in type if, for each v,
E−i xb(θi, θ−i; v, v0) and E−i xi(θi, θ−i; v, v0) are increasing in θi (MON ix)
Besides the presence of the expectation operators, the (MON iq) and (MON
i
x) are entirely stan-
dard. Note that (MON ix) just requires that as θ
i increases, the expected probabilities of inclusion also
increase. Notably, if a contract satisfies (MON iq) and (MON
i
x), then the binding downward incentive
constraints imply all other incentive constraints, which is a familiar result from static adverse selection.
Lemma 1. If (MON iq) and (MON ix) are satisfied for i = n, o, then (Ci) implies all other (ICij).
As is standard in static adverse selection, I assume that the monotonicity conditions hold, and then
later verify that they are satisfied. Now, I can reduce the number of constraints even further than
Lemma 1. By noticing that if I combine (Ci) and Promise Keeping, I obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Let vi = v if i = o and vi = v0 if i = n. A contract satisfies (Ci), (PKo), and (PKn) if
and only if, for each i, the following hold
E−i ui(θiH , θ−i) = vi + E−i fLM i(θiH , θiL, θ−i, x(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i)
− E−i δwi(θiH , θ−i)
(U iH)
E−i ui(θiL, θ−i) = vi − E−i fHM i(θiH , θiL, θ−i, x(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i)
− E−i δwi(θiL, θ−i)
(U iL)
Equations (U iH) and (U
i
L) provide an easy way to interpret the provision of rents in an optimal
contract. For example, if agent i reports θH , then (U iH) says that agent i’s expected instantaneous
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utility is equal to her promised lifetime utility vi, plus her expected information rent
fL E−iM i(θiH , θiL, θ−i, x(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i),
and less her expected discounted promise tomorrow E−i δwi(θiH , θ−i). By contrast, when i reports
θL, then (U iL) says that agent i’s expected utility is equal to her promised lifetime utility vi less her
expected information rent fH E−iM i(θiH , θiL, θ−i, x(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i) less her expected discounted
promise tomorrow E−i δwi(θiL, θ−i).
Moreover, equations (U iH) and (U
i
L) demonstrate the tension between extracting instantaneous rents
today and promising future utility. At most, the principal can extract
vi + E−i fLM i(θiH , θiL, θ−i, x(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i)
from a high demand agent. But, to do so, the principal must compensate the agent with a promise of
1
δ
(
vi + E−i fLM i(θiH , θiL, θ−i, x(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i)
)
tomorrow to insure that the agent’s liquidity constraint is not violated.
As well, from a technical perspective, (U iH) and (U
i
L) provide identities for E−i ui(θi, θ−i) solely
in terms of (v, v0) and (q, x, w). This is an important step in reducing the principal’s program to a
manageable problem.
Now, since (U iH) and (U
i
L) are equivalent to (C
i),(PKo), and (PKn), and (U iH) and (U
i
L) provide
equations for an agent’s instantaneous expected rents, I use (U iH) and (U
i
L) in conjunction with (LI
i
j)
to create a modified liquidity constraint. In particular, observe that (U iH) and (U
i
L) can be rewritten and
combined with (LI ij) to form
vi − E−i
[
δwi(θiH , θ
−i)− fLM i(θiH , θiL, θ−i, x(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i)
] ≥ 0. (LiH)
vi − E−i
[
δwi(θiL, θ
−i) + fHM i(θiH , θ
i
L, θ
−i, x(θiL, θ
−i))qi(θiL, θ
−i)
] ≥ 0. (LiL)
47
As a result of this, I restate the principal’s maximization problem in a much simpler manner
Proposition 2. The principal’s problem is to solve the following optimization program
P (v) = max
q,wx
∑
i
Eθ
[
mi(θ, x(θ; v, v0))q
i(θ; v, v0)− c(qi(θ; v, v0))
+δwi(θ; v, v0) + δP (w
i(θ; v, v0))
]− v − v0, (PR’)
subject to (LiH) and (L
i
L) for i = n, o, (MON
i
q) and (MON
i
x) for i = n, o, and Feasibility.
I have reduced the original problem of solving for (u, q, x, w) to just finding (q, x, w), and con-
densed the constraint set to four liquidity constraints, two monotonicity constraints, and several feasi-
bility constraints.
2.4.2 Optimal Contract
From Proposition 2, I see that the principal’s problem is a concave optimization problem subject to
inequality constraints, and therefore the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient. To proceed,
let λiH(v, v0) and λ
i
L(v, v0) be the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (L
i
H) and (L
i
L), respectively,
when the state is v, and v0 given. I solve this program by ignoring (MON iq), (MON
i
x), and the feasi-
bility constraints, and then demonstrate that the solution satisfies these ignored constraints. Moreover,
I take x as given when solving for the optimal (q, w), and then, finally, I solve for the optimal x.
Taking the first order conditions pointwise for qi(θi, θ−i; v, v0), so long as either
xb(θi, θ−i; v, v0) > 0 or xi(θi, θ−i; v, v0) > 0
I have
c′(qi(θiL, θ
−i)) = mi(θiL, θ
−i, x(θiL, θ
−i))− M(θ
i
H , θ
i
L, θ
−i, x(θiL, θ
−i))
fL
(fHλ
i
L − fLλiH),
c′(qi(θiH , θ
−i)) = mi(θiH , θ
−i, x(θiHθ
−i)).
(FOCq)
To better understand this first order condition, define the first-best level of qi(θi, θ−i; v, v0), which is
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the optimal q when the principal does not face incentive compatibility, and is as follows
c′(qiFB(θ
i, θ−i; v, v0)) ≡ mi(θi, θ−i, x(θi, θ−i; v, v0)).
Notice immediately the familiar No Distortion at the Top property from static adverse section is pre-
served in my setting. That is, when θi = θH , (FOCq) implies that qi(θiH , θ
−i) = qiFB(θ
i
H , θ
−i).
Next, I have the first order conditions for wi(θi, θ−i), for j = L,H
P ′(wi(θij, θ
−i)) = −1 + λ
i
j
fj
. (FOCw)
From this first order condition, it is immediate that wi(θi, θ−i; v, v0) is independent of θ−i. Moreover,
it can be shown that wi(θiH ; v, v0) ≥ wi(θiL; v, v0), which, due to the concavity of P , implies that
λiL
fL
≥ λiH
fH
. By examining (FOCq), this implies that qi(θiL, θ
−i; v, v0) ≤ qiFB(θi, θ−i; v, v0). Lastly, the
envelop conditions
P ′(v) = −1 + λo1 + λo2
P ′(v0) = −1 + λn1 + λn2 .
(ENV )
I collect the results concerning these first order conditions with the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. In an optimal contract, q, w satisfy the first order necessary conditions. Moreover, for
i = n, o and each θ−i and v, the following are true
1. qi(θiH , θ
−i; v, v0) ≥ qi(θiL, θ−i; v, v0) ≥ 0;
2. qi(θiH , θ
−i; v, v0) = qiFB(θ
i
H , θ
−i; v, v0);
3. qi(θiL, θ
−i; v, v0) ≤ qiFB(θiL, θ−i; v, v0);
4. qi(θiL, θ
−i; v, v0) = qiFB(θ
i
L, θ
−i; v, v0);
5. And, wi(θiH , θ
−i; v, v0) = wi(θiH ; v, v0) ≥ wi(θiL; v, v0) = wi(θiL, θ−i; v, v0).
From Proposition 3, q is increasing in type, and therefore satisfies (MON iq). Moreover, Proposi-
tion 3 states that q and w are feasible. Notably, Proposition 3 confirms the No Distortion at the Top
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property – when an agent reports θiH , she receives first-best quality, whereas when she reports θ
i
L, she
receives a quality distorted downward away from first-best. In static agency theory, the principal dis-
torts q(θiL, θ
−i) downward to minimize the information rents to a high type. In this dynamic model,
the principal also uses these distortions in q to align incentives; however, this is not the principal’s sole
instrument.
Recall that in Proposition 1, if wi(θi, θ−i; v, v0) < v∗, then ui(θi, θ−i; v, v0) = 0. In other words,
as long as wi(θi, θ−i; v, v0) is sufficiently low, then agent i receives zero instantaneous rents. In par-
ticular, although the firm distorts q, its main tool for incentivizing the agent is w. In Proposition 3,
wi(θiH , θ
−i; v, v0) ≥ wi(θiL, θ−i; v, v0), and hence reporting a high type yields greater lifetime utility.
In fact, I can say more. By combining (ENV ) and (FOCw), observe that
P ′(v) = fLP ′(wo(θoL, θ
n; v, v0)) + fHP
′(wo(θoH , θ
n; v, v0)),
P ′(v0) = fLP ′(wn(θnL, θ
o; v, v0)) + fHP
′(wn(θnH , θ
o; v, v0)).
Because P is concave and wi(θiH , θ
−i; v, v0) ≥ wi(θiL, θ−i; v, v0), it follows that
wi(θiH , θ
−i; v, v0) ≥ vi ≥ wi(θiL, θ−i; v, v0).
That is, reporting θiH yields an increase in promise expected lifetime utility, whereas reporting θ
i
L
yields a decrease in promise expected lifetime utility.
Although Proposition 3 delivers qualitative, local properties of q and w, it says nothing about how
these variables evolve with the state v. In particular, Proposition 3 establishes that
qi(θi, θ−i; v∗, v0) = qiFB(θ
i, θ−i),
and therefore the contract calls for the efficient allocation at v∗. However, it is not clear whether the
contract will reach this state, or how the contract unfolds when v < v∗. Proposition 4 fills in this detail.
Proposition 4. (qi(θi, θ−i; v, v0), wi(θi, θ−i; v, v0)) is increasing in (v, v0). Moreover, if v0 < v, then
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(qn(θn, θo; v, v0), w
n(θn, θo; v, v0)) ≤ (qo(θo, θn; v, v0), wo(θo, θn; v, v0)).
In particular, Proposition 4 says that the optimal contract is monotone in state. Therefore, the low
type’s distortion is decreasing in state, and promises of expected lifetime utility are increasing in state.
Notably, because wi(θiH , θ
−i; v, v0) ≥ vi, realizations of high types are unambiguously good – along a
sample of exclusively high type realizations, an agent will eventually reach the threshold v∗. That is,
there exists a realization of type draws such that v → v∗.
Before proceeding to the optimal exclusion policy, I characterize v∗. Up until this point, many of
the results have hinged on the value of v∗, and I now calculate v∗. When v = v∗, it must be the case
that qi(θi, θ−i; v∗, v0) = qiFB(θ
i, θ−i). Next, when v < v∗, E−i ui(θi, θ−i; v, v0) = 0. Therefore, by
continuity, as v → v∗, it must be the case that E−i ui(θi, θ−i) = 0. Moreover, if qi(θi, θ−i; v, v0) =
qiFB(θ
i, θ−i), then xb(θi, θ−i; v, v0) = 1. Putting these three observations together, and by examining
(U iL), I get the following result
Proposition 5. In an optimal contract
v∗ =
fH
1− δ E−i
[
(gi(θiH , θ
−i)− gi(θiL, θ−i))qiFB(θiL, θ−i)
]
. (v∗)
To understand this result, observe that (v∗) can be rewritten as
v∗ =
1
1− δ E−i
[
fH(g
i(θiH , θ
−i)− gi(θiL, θ−i))qiFB(θiL, θ−i) + fL × 0
]
.
The term within the expectation operator is merely the expected rents that an agent would receive when
v = v∗. Therefore, Proposition 5 merely states that v∗ is equal to the present discount value of being
at v∗. Note that if gi(θi, θ−i) = θi, and therefore Proposition 5 is the overlapping generations analogue
to v∗ in Krishna et al. (2013).
2.4.3 Exclusion
Up until this point, I have ignored the optimal exclusionary policy, and taken it as given. Thus,
to complete the characterization of the optimal contract, I now solve for the optimal x(θi, θ−i; v, v0).
To do so, I will greatly rely on the monotonicity of the optimal contract. In particular, the fact that
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qi(θi, θ−i; v, v0) is increasing in v and type will be very useful. Before proceeding, recall that by
definition
mi(θi, θi, x(θi, θ−i; v, v0)) = xb(θi, θ−i; v, v0)gi(θi, θ−i) + xi(θi, θ−i; v, v0)h(θi),
where 0 < h(θL) = gi(θiL, θ
−i
L ) ≤ gi(θiL, θ−iH ) ≤ gi(θiH , θ−iL ) ≤ gi(θiH , θ−iH ) = h(θH).
As a first step to understanding the design of the optimal x, consider what the principal would
do if agents were not liquidity constrained. Absent these constraints, the contract calls for allocative
efficiency; i.e., qi(θ; v, v0) = qiFB(θ
i, θ−i; v, v0) and wi(θ; v, v0) = v∗. Since qiFB(θ
i
H , θ
−i; v, v0) is
defined as
c′(qiFB(θ
i
H , θ
−i; v, v0)) = mi(θi, θ−i, x(θi, θ−i; v, v0)),
the exclusion decision enters the optimal q via mi(θi, θ−i, x(θi, θ−i; v, v0)). Therefore, the optimal
exclusionary policy absent liquidity constraints is merely the policy that maximizes
mi(θi, θ−i, x(θi, θ−i; v, v0)).
In other words, optimization is tantamount to comparing the relative differences between gi(θi, θ−i)
and hi(θi). Without liquidity constraints, when θi = θ−i, this comparison is simple, since hi(θi) =
gi(θi, θ−i). Therefore, it is optimal to admit both agents at first-best when both agents report the same
type – i.e., xbFB(θ
i, θ−i) = 1 when θi = θ−i.
By contrast, when θi 6= θ−i, there are tradeoffs involved when deciding whether to admit both
agents, even at first-best. For example, assume that θi = θL and θ−i = θH ; notice that the case of
θi = θH and θ−i = θL are symmetric. The decision to admit agent i has no effect on the future
surplus w + P (w), since w(θi, θ−i; v, v0) = v∗ at first-best; however, it does affect instantaneous
surplus via the externality. Admitting both types (xb(θiL, θ
−i
H ) = 1) yields an instantaneous surplus
of 1
2
gi(θiL, θ
−i
H )
2 + 1
2
g−i(θiL, θ
−i
H )
2, whereas admitting only the high type (x−i(θiL, θ
−i
H ) = 1) yields an
instantaneous surplus of 1
2
h(θ−iH )
2. Therefore, absent liquidity constraints, the principal will always
52
admit low types if and only if
gi(θiL, θ
−i
H )
2 + g−i(θiL, θ
−i
H )
2 ≥ h(θ−iH )2. (EX)
This condition is rather straightforward – the principal will only admit both types at first best if doing
so yields greater net surplus.
(EX) simply characterizes the contract at first-best; however, there is no direct analogue to the
liquidity constrained case. Fortunately, (EX) does at least provide a necessary condition for the optimal
liquidity constrained contract. In particular, if (EX) does not hold, then clearly admitting both types
must generate less instantaneous surplus in the liquidity constrained optimal contract, due to the fact
that qi(θi, θ−i; v, v0) is monotone in v. Notice that (EX) is related to the submodularity of g. That is, if
the function zi(θi, θ−i) ≡ gi(θi, θ−i)gi(θi, θ−i) is submodular, then (EX) will be satisfied.
Now, while (EX) may guide the analysis of the instantaneous incentives, one needs to be wary of
the role of x on dynamic incentives. Recall that without the liquidity constraint, wi(θ; v, v0) = v∗,
so x had no effect on the design of wi(θ; v, v0). However, when the liquidity constraints are present,
any choice of the exclusionary policy may affect wi(θ; v, v0). Fortunately, instantaneous and dynamic
incentives are aligned in this case, which allows the following result, which makes a functional form
assumption about the cost function.
Proposition 6. Assume that c takes the following functional form
c(q) =

q2
2
+ κ if q > 0
0 if q = 0 ,
for κ > 0. In an optimal contract xb(θi1, θ
−i
1 ) = x
b(θi2, θ
−i
2 ) = 1, and
1. If (EX) holds, then there exists v˜ such that if v ≥ v˜, then xb(θiL, θ−iH ) = xb(θiH , θ−iL ) = 1. And if
v < v˜, then xi(θiH , θ
−i
L ) = 1 and x
−i(θiL, θ
−i
H ) = 1
2. If (EX) does not hold, then xi(θiH , θ
−i
L ) = 1 and x
−i(θiL, θ
−i
H ) = 1
To understand Proposition 6, consider why the principal might set xb(θi, θ−i) = 1. In this case,
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the principal finds it optimal to include both agents this period. When θi = θ−i, neither agent affects
the other via the externality, and thus xb(θi, θ−i) = 1 so long as each generate positive surplus. This is
clearly true when θi = θ−i = θL or θi = θ−i = θH .
However, when θi 6= θ−i, then the agent with the lower type is extorting a negative externality
on the agent with a higher type. In the case where (EX) does not hold, the efficient allocation is to
only include the high type given a type realization of θi 6= θ−i. Therefore, in the constrained-efficient
contract, it must be the case that only high types are included when θi 6= θ−i.
On the other hand, when θi 6= θ−i but (EX) holds, then the efficient allocation is include both the
high and low types when θi 6= θ−i. But this does not necessarily imply that the low type will also
be included in the constrained-efficient contract. In the optimal liquidity constrained contract, there
are two effects that could potentially make it unprofitable for the principal to include the low type:
(i) low types receive a quality distorted sufficiently away from first-best so as to generate negative
instantaneous surplus; (ii) the inclusion of low types affects promises of future utility.
In the proof of Proposition 6, I show that by including a low type when the type realization is
θi 6= θ−i, tomorrow’s social surplus, w + P (w), is lower. The intuition for this is as such: By always
including the low type, incentive compatibility requires that wi(θiL; v, v0) be relatively low and that
wi(θiH ; v, v0) be relatively high. By contrast, when the principal only includes the low type when the
realization is θi = θ−i = θL, the principal must promise more future utility to low types, but less to
high types. Due to the concavity of P , from the perspective of future rents, the principal prefers to
exclude the low type when the realization is θi 6= θ−i.
Hence, when the type realization is θi 6= θ−i, both effects (i) and (ii) suggest that the principal has
an incentive to exclude the low type. And when the state v is sufficiently low, these effects dominate
(EX). On the other hand, since at v = v∗, the optimal contract includes both agents, it must be the
case that as v → v∗, effects (i) and (ii) dissipate and become second-order, and the principal elects to
include low types.
A direct consequence of Proposition 6 is that if v0 is sufficiently low, then the firm exhibits a bias
against n agents. In particular, if (EX) holds and v0 < v˜, then the firm will only admit young agents
either when θn = θH or (θn, θo) = (θL, θL). By contrast, the firm is more likely to include o agents
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who draw θL.
2.5 Conclusion
I characterize the optimal contract in a setting where a long-lived principal contracts with overlap-
ping generations of agents who draw their types from an i.i.d. process and exert an externality upon
each other’s preferences. In Theorem 1, I demonstrate that the optimal contract can be found by solv-
ing a concave dynamic programming problem, where the state is promised lifetime utility. Through
Proposition 1 and 3, I conclude that the optimal contract is backloaded, there is no distortion in quality
at the top, and quality distorted downward from first-best at the bottom.
In Proposition 4, I show that the optimal contract is monotone in state. As a result, drawing a high
type is unambiguously good, since consecutive draws of high types leads to increasing promises of
future utility towards the efficient contract. Consequently, the firm’s exclusion decisions are monotone
as well. As is stated in Proposition 6, the firm is more likely to include all types of the agent as the state
increases. Moreover, this creates a bias against young agents who have low promises of future utility.
Finally, in Proposition 5, I characterize the threshold v∗, above which an agent indefinitely receives
the efficient contract.
Within the context of the retirement community example, I may interpret the results as follows:
The firm initially incentivizes new residents through the promises of future services, while screening
agents who report low health, which the firm does through distorting services away from first-best and
excluding those in low health. This is precisely the model that Continuing Care Retirement Commu-
nities use, where retirees often cannot get access to the health care wings of the facility immediately
upon joining. Residents must instead join the community when they are in good health, and are then
guaranteed the benefit of intensive health care after they achieve some degree of tenure within the
facility.
At this point, this chapter is lacking two main features – no discussion of long-term dynamics and
the limitation to only two types. Concerning the long-term dynamics, the results from Krishna et al.
(2013) should carry over intact to guarantee that the optimal contract converges almost surely to first-
best in finite time. This result can be shown by demonstrating that the derivative of the value function
with respect to the state is martingale, and thus Doob’s Martingale Convergence Theorem will hold, as
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is the case in Thomas and Worrall (1990). As for expanding beyond two types, my hypothesis is that
all results should remain intact after some modification.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 1
A.1 Proofs from Section 1.3.1
Proof of Theorem 1. This proof is standard and uses techniques from Stokey et al. (1989). I omit
a proof of the equivalence between the recursive formulation and the sequential formulation of the
problem, which would require a slight adaptation of the methods in Fernandes and Phelan (2000) to
allow for the (LI) constraint.
Recall that v, vˆ ∈ [0,∞). Feasibly, the principal’s value function can lie between a lower bound
where the firm offer the agent v utils with no production, and the upper bound formed by first-best
production by an agent who always draws a high type. Altogether,
0 ≤ P (v, vˆ, θ−) + v ≤ 1
1− δ
(
θHq
FB(θH)− c(qFB(θH))
)
.
Clearly, this is not a tight upper bound. Now, let A ≡ R2+×Θ and let C(A) be the space of continuous
function Q : A→ R+. Define
F ≡
{
Q ∈ C(A) : 0 ≤ Q(v, vˆ, θ−) + v ≤ 1
1− δ
(
θHq
FB(θH)− c(qFB(θH))
)}
.
When endowed with the “sup” metric, F is a complete metric space. Define F1 to be the set of all
concave Q ∈ F , F2 to be the set of all Q ∈ F such Q(v, vˆ, θ−) + v is constant in v for all v ≥ v∗(θ−),
and F3 to be the set of all Q ∈ F such Q(v, vˆ, θ−) is constant in vˆ for all vˆ ≥ vˆ∗(θ−). F1, F2, and F3
are closed subsets of F .
For (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−) and s = (θ−, v, vˆ), define
Ω(s) ≡
 (q, u, w, wˆ) ∈ R
2
+×R2+×R2+×R2+ s.t. (q, u, w, wˆ)
satisfy IC, PK, TK, and w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s) ∈ W ∗(θ)
 .
Notice that (q, u, w, wˆ) ∈ Ω(s) satisfy both liquidity and feasibility. Consider the operator T : F → F
defined as
(TQ)(v, vˆ, θ−) = max
(q,u,w,wˆ)∈Ω(s)
∑
θH ,θL
f(θ|θ−) [θq(θ; s)− c(q(θ; s))− u(θ; s)
+δQ(w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s), θ)]
It is immediate that 0 ≤ (TQ)(v, vˆ, θ−) + v ≤ 11−δ
(
θHq
FB(θH)− c(qFB(θH))
)
. Moreover, since
Ω(s) is a finite set of linear constraints, it is compact, and thus (TQ)(v, vˆ, θ−) achieves its maximum.
Therefore, by the Theorem of the Maximum, (TQ)(v, vˆ, θ−) is continuous. Altogether, it follows that
if Q ∈ F , then TQ ∈ F .
By Stokey et al. (1989), the operator T preserves concave functions. In other words, if Q ∈ F1,
then TQ ∈ F1. Next, take Q ∈ F2 ∩F3, and consider the following relaxed program
max
(q,u,w,wˆ)
∑
θH ,θL
f(θ|θ−) [θq(θ; s)− c(q(θ; s)) + δw(θ; s) + δQ(w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s), θ)]− v
s.t. (PK) and (TK),
where v ≥ v∗(θ−) and vˆ ≥ vˆ∗(θ−). First, I claim that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to (v, vˆ) such that |v − vˆ| = ρ∆qFB(θL)
1−δρ . To see this, first note that I later show that |v∗(θ−)− vˆ∗(θ−)| =
ρ∆qFB(θL)
1−δρ in Proposition 3. Moreover, in Lemma 2, I demonstrate that (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θH) implies that
v ≥ vˆ and (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θL) implies that vˆ ≥ v. Now, sinceQ ∈ F2 ∩F3, the value function is constant
in vˆ, and thus I am free to vary vˆ to insure that |v − vˆ| = ρ∆qFB(θL)
1−δρ . And by simple computation, for
any θ− and v ≥ v∗(θ−), there exists some vˆ ≥ vˆ∗(θ−) such that the desired condition holds.
Returning to the relaxed program, if I restrict attention to (v, vˆ) such that |v − vˆ| = ρ∆qFB(θL)
1−δρ , a
solution to this problem is to set q(θi; s) = qFB(θi; s), w(θi; s) = v∗(θi), wˆ(θi; s) = vˆ∗(θi),
u(θL; s) = v − δv∗(θL)− f(θH |θ−)∆q
FB(θL)
1− δρ ,
and u(θH ; s) = v − δv∗(θH) + f(θL|θ−)∆q
FB(θL)
1− δρ .
One can verify that this solution satisfies all constraints. Therefore, this solution is in Ω(s) for v ≥
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v∗(θ−) and vˆ ≥ vˆ∗(θ−), so long as (v∗(θ−), vˆ∗(θ−)) ∈ W ∗(θ−), which I prove through Lemma 2 and
Proposition 3. Consequently, this relaxed solution must also be a solution to the original program.
Moreover, for v, v′ ≥ v∗(θ−) and vˆ ≥ vˆ∗(θ−) such that (v, vˆ), (v′, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−), I have
(TQ)(v, vˆ, θ−)− (TQ)(v′, vˆ, θ−) = −(v − v′),
which implies that TQ ∈ F2. Similarly, for vˆ, vˆ′ ≥ vˆ∗(θ−) and v ≥ v∗(θ−) such that (v, vˆ), (v, vˆ′) ∈
W ∗(θ−), I have
(TQ)(v, vˆ, θ−)− (TQ)(v, vˆ′, θ−) = 0.
And this implies that TQ ∈ F3.
Putting these results together, it follows that if Q ∈ ⋂i=1,2,3F i, then TQ ∈ ⋂i=1,2,3F i. In addi-
tion, it is straightforward to verify that T satisfies monotonicity and discounting. As a result, T is a
contraction mapping with a unique fixed point P that lies in
⋂
i=1,2,3F i.
Now, I want to show that P1(0, 0, θ−) =∞. To see this, first notice that when v = vˆ = 0, the only
feasibly contract is to set u(θi) = w(θi) = wˆ(θi) = 0, for each θi, q(θH) = qFB(θH), and q(θL) = 0.
Therefore, it follows that
P (0, 0, θ−) = f(θH |θ−)(θHqFB(θH)− c(q(θH))) + δ
∑
θH ,θL
f(θ|θ−)P (0, 0, θ).
Since P is concave, it must be that P1(0, 0, θ−) ≥ P (,0,θ−)−P (0,0,θ−) for each  > 0.
Instead, consider an alternate contract such that q(θH) = qFB(θH), q(θL) = x, w(θ) = wˆ(θ) = 0,
u(θL) = 0, and u(θH) = ∆x in the first period, and in all subsequent periods (v, vˆ) = 0. That is, in
all subsequent period, the alternate contract corresponds with the aforementioned contract. Let x be
defined by
 = f(θH |θ−)∆x,
for some  > 0 and θ− initially given. This contract satisfies all constraints. The payoff to the principal
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under this new contract is given by
Q(, 0, θ−) = f(θH |θ−)(θHqFB(θH)− c(qFB(θH))) + f(θL|θ−)(θLx− c(x))− 
+ δ
∑
θH ,θL
f(θ|θ−)P (0, 0, θ)
= P (0, 0, θ−) + f(θL|θ−)(θLx− c(x))− 
Notice that P (, 0, θ−) ≥ Q(, 0, θ−) and, since as  converges to zero, x→ 0,
lim
→0
Q(, 0, θ−) = P (0, 0, θ−).
Additionally,
Q(, 0, θ−)− P (0, 0, θ−) = f(θL|θ−)(θLx− c(x))− ,
and therefore
lim
→0
Q(, 0, θ−)− P (0, 0, θ−)

= lim
→0
f(θL|θ−)(θLx− c(x))− 

=
f(θL|θ−)
f(θH |θ−) limx→0
(
θLx− c(x)
∆x
)
− 1
=
f(θL|θ−)
f(θH |θ−)
(
θL − limx→0 c(x)/x
∆
)
− 1
=
f(θL|θ−)
f(θH |θ−)
(
θL − limq→0 c′(q)
∆
)
− 1
=∞,
where the second equality holds because  = f(θH |θ−)∆x and the last equality holds because
lim
q→0
c′(q) = −∞.
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Finally,
P1(0, 0, θ−) = lim
→0
P (, 0, θ−)− P (0, 0, θ−)

≥ lim
→0
Q(, 0, θ−)− P (0, 0, θ−)

=∞.
Hence P1(0, 0, θ−) =∞. This implies that (v, vˆ) ∈ int R2+, and therefore, by results from Stokey et al.
(1989), I can conclude that P is continuously differentiable in (v, vˆ).
Proof of Lemma 1. Notice that the second part of the Lemma is implied directly by the definition of
a maximal rent contract. To prove the first part, assume that there exists an optimal contract b =
(u, q, w, wˆ) such that w(θ; θ−, v, vˆ) < v∗(θ) but u(θ; θ−, v, vˆ) > 0. Now, consider an alternate contract
b˜, where b˜ is identical to b except u˜(θ; θ−, v, vˆ) = u(θ; θ−, v, vˆ)− and w˜(θ; θ−, v, vˆ) = w(θ; θ−, v, vˆ)+

δ
, for some  > 0. By assumption, there exists some  > 0 such that w˜(θ; θ−, v, vˆ) < v∗(θ) and
w˜(θ; θ−, v, vˆ) > 0. This new contract b˜ satisfies all constraints, but since v + P (v, vˆ, θ−) is strictly
increasing at w(θ; θ−, v, vˆ), it follows that b˜ strictly dominates b, which contradicts the fact that b was
an optimal contract.
A.2 Proofs from Section 1.4.1
First, to solve the contracting problem with no liquidity constraint, I must simplify the constraint
set. I employ the standard procedure of binding the downward incentive constraint. I later show in
Lemma 3 that the downward constraint binds, but for now, take that as given. Consider the following
program, which is (PR), less feasibility, implementability, and liquidity.
P (v, vˆ, θ−) = max
q,u,w,wˆ
∑
θ
f(θ|θ−) [θq(θ; s)− c(q(θ; s))− u(θ; s) + δP (w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s), θ)] ,
subject to
u(θH ; s) + δw(θH ; s) ≥ u(θL; s) + δwˆ(θL; s) + (θH − θL)q(θL; s);
61
v = f(θH |θ−) (u(θH ; s) + δw(θH ; s)) + f(θL|θ−) (u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s)) ;
vˆ = f(θH |θ˜−) (u(θH ; s) + δw(θH ; s)) + f(θL|θ˜−) (u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s)) .
Let λ(s), η(s), and ηˆ(s) be the multipliers for the DIC, PK, and TK constraints, respectively, when the
state is s. Taking first order conditions, I have
c′(q(θH ; s)) = θH
c′(q(θL; s) = θL − (θH − θL)λ(s)
f(θL|θ−) ≤ θL
P1(w(θH ; s), wˆ(θH ; s), θH) = −1
P1(w(θL; s), wˆ(θL; s), θL) = η(s) +
f(θL|θ−)
f(θL|θ˜−)
ηˆ(s) > −1
Through these first order conditions, clearly q(θH ; s) = qFB(θH) and q(θL; s) ≤ qFB(θL). As long
as λ(s) > 0, then q(θL; s) < qFB(θL). From the proof of Lemma 3, the DIC will bind whenever
wˆ(θL; s) < vˆ
∗(θL), which will be satisfied so long as v < v∗(θH). Moreover, due to Theorem 1, it
follows that w(θH ; s) = v∗(θH) and w(θL; s) ≤ v∗(θL). I defer the calculation of v∗(θ) until later.
A.3 Proofs from Section 1.4.2
Proof of Lemma 2. This proof adapts a method from Fu and Krishna (2015). First observe that it
cannot be the case that (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−) but v > 0 and vˆ = 0, or vice versa. This is immediate from
(PK) and (TK). Now, letW denote space of closed, convex, compact subsets of R2++, and define the
operator B :W →W as follows, for each W ∈ W .
B(W )(θ−) ≡
(v, vˆ) ∈ R2++ :
∃(u, q, w, wˆ) that implements (v, vˆ)
s.t. (w(θ), wˆ(θ)) ∈ W (θ) ∀θ
 ,
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where by “implements” I mean that (u, q, w, wˆ) satisfies (PK), (TK), (IC), (LI), and (FE) under the
state (θ−, v, vˆ).
Now, consider Wα ≡
{
(v, vˆ) ∈ R2++ : v ≥ αvˆ
}
, for α ∈ [0, 1). As well, let
Bn(W ) ≡ B(Bn−1(W )).
To prove this result, I first show that B(Wβ)(θ−) = Wα, for some α > β. Therefore, Bn(W0) = Wαn ,
for some αn ∈ [0, 1), and Wαn ⊂ Wαn′ for αn > αn′ . Hence, {Bn(W0)}n is a decreasing, nested
sequence of sets in W , and limn→∞Bn(W0) = W1. Lastly, I will show that B(W1) = W1, which
implies that W1 is a fixed point of the operator B, and thus W ∗(θ−) = B(W1)(θ−).
To show thatB(Wβ)(θ−) = Wα for some α > β, take (w, wˆ) ∈ Wβ , which implies thatw(θH ; s) ≥
βwˆ(θH ; s) and wˆ(θL; s) ≥ βw(θL; s). Suppose θ− = θH , and consider the difference v − αvˆ, for
α ∈ [0, 1). By (PK) and (TK), I have
v − αvˆ =
∑
θ
(f(θ|θH)− αf(θ|θL)(u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s))
≥ (f(θH |θH)− αf(θH |θL))(u(θL; s) + δwˆ(θL; s) + ∆q(θL; s))
+ (f(θL|θH)− αf(θL|θH))(u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s))
≥ (f(θH |θH)− αf(θH |θL))(u(θL; s) + δβw(θL; s) + ∆q(θL; s))
+ (f(θL|θH)− αf(θL|θH))(u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s))
≥ β(f(θH |θH)− αf(θH |θL))(u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s))
+ (f(θL|θH)− αf(θL|θL))(u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s))
where the first inequality holds because of the downward (IC), the second inequality because wˆ(θL; s) ≥
βw(θL; s), and the third inequality because u(θ; s), q(θ; s) ≥ 0. If I set
α =
βf(θH |θH) + f(θL|θH)
βf(θH |θL) + f(θL|θH) ,
computation shows that the last line of the preceding equation is zero and α ∈ (β, 1). Using the same
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α, a similar series of inequalities will show that vˆ − αv ≥ 0 when θ− = θL.
Therefore, given (w, wˆ) ∈ Wβ , I can find α > β such that B(Wβ) = Wα ⊂ Wβ . Consequently, I
have that {Bn(W0)}n is a decreasing, nested sequence. Clearly limn→∞Bn(W0) = W1.
To complete the proof, I just need to demonstrate that B(W1)(θ−) = W1. To see this, consider
(w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s)) ∈ W1(θ), for each θ. Moreover, assume that θ− = θH . Then
v − vˆ =
∑
θ
(f(θ|θH)− f(θ|θL)(u(θ; s) + δw(θ; s))
≥ (f(θH |θH)− f(θH |θL))(u(θL; s) + δwˆ(θL; s) + ∆q(θL; s))
+ (f(θL|θH)− f(θL|θL))(u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s))
≥ (f(θH |θH)− f(θH |θL))(u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s) + ∆q(θL; s))
+ (f(θL|θH)− f(θL|θL))(u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s))
≥
∑
θ
(f(θ|θH)− f(θ|θL))(u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s))
= 0,
where the first inequality follows from (IC), the second inequality from
(w(θL; s), wˆ(θ; s)) ∈ W1(θL),
and the third inequality from q(θL; s), u(θL; s) ≥ 0. A similar computation will show that when
θ− = θL, (w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s)) ∈ W1(θ) implies that vˆ − v ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. First, to see that the downward (IC) binds, assume not, i.e. there is some state s
such that in an optimal contract the following is true
u(θH ; s) + δw(θH ; s) > u(θL; s) + δwˆ(θL; s) + ∆q(θL; s).
Moreover, assume that wˆ(θL; s) < vˆ∗(θL). Notice that in this case I can increase wˆ(θL; s) by  > 0
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and all constraints will be satisfied; notably, vˆ∗(θ−) ≥ wˆ(θL; s) +  > w(θL; s). From Theorem 1, P
is increasing in its second argument, so wˆ(θL; s) +  is preferred to wˆ(θL; s), which is a contradiction.
Assume that θ− = θH , and therefore v − vˆ ≥ 0. From (PK) and (TK),
(f(θH |θH)− f(θH |θL) (u(θH + δw(θH)− u(θL)− δw(θL)) ≥ 0.
When θ− = θH , the LHS of the preceding inequality is positive, which implies that
U(θH ; θH , v, vˆ) ≥ U(θL; θH , v, vˆ).
Taking θ− = θL, I have vˆ − v ≥ 0, and by (PK) and (TK) this implies that
(f(θH |θH)− f(θH |θL)) (u(θH + δw(θH)− u(θL)− δw(θL)) ≥ 0.
Since ρ ≥ 0, this implies that U(θH ; θL, v, vˆ) ≥ U(θL; θL, v, vˆ).
Finally, that U(θH ; s) ≥ v ≥ U(θL; s) and U(θH ; s) ≥ vˆ ≥ U(θL; s) follows immediately from
(PK) and (TK).
Proof of Lemma 4. By combing the downward (IC) constraint and (PK),
v = f(θH |θ−)(u(θL; s) + δwˆ(θL; s) + ∆q(θL; s)) + f(θL|θ−)(u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s)),
and straightforward algebra obtains (UL). A similar substitution involving the downward (IC) con-
straint and (TK) gets (UˆL). By substitution (UL) and (UˆL) back into the downward (IC) constraint
obtains (UH) and (UˆH). Hence the downward (IC) constraint, (PK), and (TK) implies these four equal-
ities. The reverse implication requires a similar calculation.
Proof of Lemma 5. This is a directly consequence of Lemma 4.
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A.4 Proofs from Section 1.5
Proof of Proposition 2. Parts one through four of Proposition 2 are proven in the text preceding the
Proposition. To prove part five, assume that w∗(θL; s) = v∗(θL). From (FOCwL), this implies that
Γ(s) = Γˆ(s) = 0. Therefore, (FOCqL) is c
′(q∗(θL; s)) = θL and (FOCwH ) becomes
P2(w
∗(θH ; s), wˆ∗(θH ; s), θH) = −1,
which implies that q∗(θL; s) = qFB(θL) and w∗(θH ; s) = v∗(θH).
For part six, assume that w∗(θH ; s) = v∗(θH). Therefore, the state next period will be s′ =
(θH , v
∗(θH), vˆ∗(θH)). I know that at s′, P1 = −1 and P2 = 0, so by (ENV ) and (ÊNV), it must be the
case that Γ(s′) = Γˆ(s′) = 0. From (FOCwL) and (FOCqL) this implies that q
∗(θL; s′) = qFB(θL) and
w∗(θL; s′) = v∗(θL).
Proof of Proposition 3. When
(θ−, v, vˆ) = (θ−, v∗(θ−), vˆ∗(θ−)),
from Theorem 1, I know that P1(v, vˆ, θ−) = −1. This implies that γ(θL, θ−) = γ(θH , θ−) = 0, which
also implies that γ(θL, θˆ−) = γ(θH , θˆ−) = 0. From the first order conditions, it must then be the case
that w(θ; s) = v∗(θ−) and wˆ(θ; s) = vˆ∗(θ−).
When v < v∗(θ−), Theorem 1 says that P1(v, vˆ, θ−) > 0, and thus by (ENV ), γ(θH , θ−) +
γ(θL, θ−) > 0, which implies that
min{u(θH ; θ−, v, vˆ), u(θL; θ−, v, vˆ)} = 0.
By Lemma 3, I know that U(θH ; θ−, v, vˆ) ≥ U(θL; θ−, v, vˆ), so for (v, vˆ, θ−) such that v < v∗(θ−) it
most be the case that
u(θL; θ−, v, vˆ) = 0.
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Due to the fact the optimal contract is continuous in (v, vˆ), it follows that
u(θL; θ−, v∗(θ−), vˆ∗(θ−)) = 0.
Using (UL) and (UˆL), a straightforward calculation obtains (v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ)).
Before I can prove Proposition 4, I need the following, which is stated as Lemma 6. This result is
also useful outside of the proof of Proposition 4, since it provides bounds on implementable states in
a optimal contract, and these bounds are useful for the calculation of the simulated contract.
Lemma 6. In an optimal maximal rent contract,
1. (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θH) implies that
0 ≤ v − vˆ ≤ ρ∆q
FB(θL)
1− δρ .
2. (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θL) implies that
0 ≤ vˆ − v ≤ ρ∆q
FB(θL)
1− δρ .
Proof of Lemma 6. To prove Lemma 6, I will show that if {q∗(θ; s), w∗(θ; s), wˆ∗(θ; s)} is an optimal
contract, (w∗(θ; s), wˆ∗(θ; s)) ∈ W ∗(θ) implies that |w∗(θ; s)− wˆ∗(θ; s)| ≤ ρ∆qFB(θL)
1−δρ .
LetW denote space of closed, convex, compact subsets of R2++, and define the operator B :W →
W as follows, for each W ∈ W .
B(W )(θ−) ≡
(v, vˆ) ∈ R2++ :
∃(u, q, w, wˆ) that implements (v, vˆ)
s.t. (w(θ), wˆ(θ)) ∈ W (θ) ∀θ
 ,
where by “implements” I mean that (u, q, w, wˆ) satisfies (PK), (TK), (IC), (LI), and (FE) under the
state (θ−, v, vˆ). To complete this proof, I will demonstrate that the operator B preserves properties one
and two in the statement of Lemma 6 when I restrict attention to optimal maximal rent contracts.
In other words, I will show that if |w∗(θ; s)− wˆ∗(θ; s)| ≤ ρ∆qFB(θL)
1−δρ , then |v − vˆ| ≤ ρ∆q
FB(θL)
1−δρ .
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From (PK) and (TK), I have
|v − vˆ| = ρ (u∗(θH ; s) + δw∗(θH ; s)− u∗(θL; s)− δw∗(θL; s))
= ρ (δwˆ∗(θL; s) + ∆q∗(θL; s)− δw∗(θL; s))
≤ ρ (δwˆ∗(θL; s) + ∆qFB(θL)− δw∗(θL; s))
≤ ρ
(
∆qFB(θL) + δ
ρ∆qFB(θL)
1− δρ
)
=
ρ∆qFB(θL)
1− δρ
where the second equality holds from the binding downward (IC) constraint, the first inequality be-
cause q∗(θL; s) ≤ qFB(θL) in a optimal contract, and the second inequality due to the restriction that
|w∗(θ; s)− wˆ∗(θ; s)| ≤ ρ∆qFB(θL)
1−δρ . This completes the proof.
Notice that Lemma 6 says that the bound on |v − vˆ| is increasing in ρ. Moreover, when ρ → 0,
v = vˆ in an optimal maximal rent contract.
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that the upward (IC) constraint requires that u(θL; s) + δw(θL; s) ≥
u(θH ; s) + δwˆ(θH ; s)−∆q(θH ; s). To prove that this holds in an optimal contract, first notice that by
(FOCwˆH ), wˆ
∗(θH ; s) must be its maximal implementable value, i.e., wˆ∗(θH ; s) = w∗(θH ; s). More-
over, q∗(θH ; s) = qFB(θH). Therefore, I need to show the following to prove this result
U∗(θL; s) ≥ U∗(θH ; s)−∆qFB(θH),
where U∗(θ; s) = u∗(θ; s) + δw∗(θ; s).
Now, by subtracting (TK) from (PK), it follows that U∗(θH ; s)−U∗(θL; s) = |v − vˆ|. So I need to
show that ρ∆qFB(θH) ≥ |v − vˆ|. Assume not. By Lemma 6, this implies that
ρ∆qFB(θH) < |v − vˆ| ≤ ρ∆q
FB(θL)
1− δρ .
In other words, (1 − δρ)qFB(θH) < qFB(θL). This implies that (1 − δρ)(c′)−1(θH) < (c′)−1(θL),
which is a contradiction.
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A.5 Proofs from Section 1.6
Proof of Proposition 5. I break the proof of part one into two steps. First, I show that for each θ−,
there exists v¯(θ−) such that when (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−) with v < v¯(θ−), then q(θL; θ−, v, vˆ) < qFB(θL).
Then, I show that v¯(θ−) = v∗(θH) for each θ−.
To prove the first step, suppose not – that for all v¯(θ−) there exists some (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−) with
v < v¯(θ−) such that q(θL; θ−, v, vˆ) = qFB(θL). Now, recall that when (v, vˆ) = (0, 0), it must be the
case that q(θL; θ−, 0, 0) = 0. But the optimal contract is continuous in (v, vˆ), which contradicts the
supposition that q(θL; θ−, v, vˆ) = qFB(θL) for v arbitrarily close to zero.
Finally, to prove that v¯(θ−) = v∗(θH) , suppose for a contradiction that v¯(θ−) < v∗(θH). Therefore,
there exists some (v0, vˆ0) ∈ W ∗(θ−) with v0 ∈ (v¯(θ−), v∗(θH)) such that q(θL; s0) = qFB(θL), where
s0 = (θ−, v0, vˆ0). Since v0 < v∗(θH), I know that P1(v0, vˆ0, θ−) > −1, and by (ENV ) this implies
that Γ(s0) > 0. Therefore, at least one liquidity constraint must bind.
Because q(θL; s0) = qFB(θL) by assumption, (FOCqL) implies that
f(θH |θ−)γ(θL; s0) + f(θH |θˆ−)γˆ(θL; s0) = f(θL|θ−)γ(θH ; s0) + f(θL|θˆ−)γˆ(θH ; s0).
Consequently, both liquidity constraints bind. Using this fact as well as the assumption that q(θL; s0) =
qFB(θL), one can obtain the following identity via equating (L(θL; s)) and (L(θH ; s))
δw(θH ; s0) = ∆q
FB(θL) + δwˆ(θL; s0).
Now, by (FOCwˆL), I can see that
P2(w(θL; s0), wˆ(θL; s0), θL) = 0.
And since P (., ., θL) is weakly increasing in its second argument, this implies that in such a contract
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wˆ(θL; s0) is the maximal implementable vˆ in W ∗(θL), i.e., wˆ(θL; s0) = vˆ∗(θL). Finally,
δw(θH ; s0) = ∆q
FB(θL) + δwˆ(θL; s0)
= ∆qFB(θL) + δvˆ
∗(θL)
= ∆qFB(θL) + δv
∗(θH) > δv∗(θH),
where the third equality holds because vˆ∗(θL) = v∗(θH) by Proposition 3. This implies thatw(θH ; s0) >
v∗(θH), and thus I have a contradiction.
To prove part two, suppose not – that for all v(θ−) there exists some (v, vˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−) with v <
v(θ−) such that w(θH ; θ−, v, vˆ) = v∗(θH). Recall that when (v, vˆ) = (0, 0), it must be the case that
w(θH ; θ−, 0, 0) = 0. But the optimal contract is continuous in (v, vˆ), which contradicts the supposition
that w(θH ; θ−, v, vˆ) = v∗(θH) for v arbitrarily close to zero.
A.6 Proofs from Section 1.7
Before I proceed with the proofs from Section 1.7, I must first state the analogue to Theorem 1 for
the generalized mechanism. I omit the proof of this result, as it is essentially identical of the proof of
Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. There exists a unique function P such that the principal’s program can be written as
follows
P (v, vˆ, θ−) = max
b(s)∈Ω′(s)
∑
θ
f(θ|θ−) [x(θ; s) (θq(θ; s)− c(q(θ; s))− u(θ; s))
+δP (w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s), θ)] ,
(PR)
where Ω′(s) is the set of contracts that satisfy (PK’), (TK’), (IC’), (LI’), (FE’), and (IM’) when the
state is s. Moreover, P has the following properties:
1. P is concave, continuously differentiable in its first two arguments, and, for all θ−,
P1(0, 0, θ−) =∞;
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2. For each θ−, there exists (v∗(θ−; `), vˆ∗(θ−; `)) ∈ W ∗(θ−) such that if (ν, νˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−), ν ≥
v∗(θ−; `), and νˆ ≥ vˆ∗(θ−; `), then P1(ν, νˆ, θ−) = −1. And if (ν, νˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−), ν < v∗(θ−; `),
and νˆ < vˆ∗(θ−; `), then P1(ν, νˆ, θ−) > −1.
3. For each θ−, there exists (v∗(θ−; `), vˆ∗(θ−; `)) ∈ W ∗(θ−) such that if (ν, νˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−), νˆ ≥
vˆ∗(θ−; `), and ν ≥ v∗(θ−; `), then P2(ν, νˆ, θ−) = 0. And if (ν, νˆ) ∈ W ∗(θ−), νˆ < vˆ∗(θ−; `), and
ν < v∗(θ−; `), then P2(ν, νˆ, θ−) ≥ 0.
Lemma 7. In an optimal, maximal rent contract with generalized constraints, the thresholds are
v∗(θ; `) =
`
1− δ +
χ(θ)∆qFB(θL)
1− δ ,
vˆ∗(θ; `) =
`
1− δ +
χ(θˆ)∆qFB(θL)
1− δ ,
where χ(θ) = δf(θH |θL)+(1−δ)f(θH |θ)
1−δρ .
Proof of Lemma 7. I omit the details of this proof, as it follows similarly as the proof of Proposition 3.
To complete this proof, one would obtain (UL), etc., except using the generalized constraints, and
proceed from there.
Notice that Lemma 7 implies that v∗(θ; `) is increasing in ` at rate 1
1−δ . Now I move on to the proof
of the main result in Section 1.7.
Proof of Proposition 6. First, I prove part one. Define
Π(θ; s) ≡ max
b(θ;s)∈Ω′(θ;s)
θq(θ)− c(q(θ)) + δP (w(θ), wˆ(θ), θ),
i.e., the upper bound for the principal from including an agent who reports type θ when the state is s.
By (IC’), Π(θ; s) ≤ θqFB(θ)− c(qFB(θ)) + δP (v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ), θ).
Now, choose ¯` = maxθ θqFB(θ) − c(qFB(θ)) + δP (v∗(θ), vˆ∗(θ), θ). For all ` ≥ ¯`, choosing
x(θ; s) = 1 for any θ will yield P (s) < 0. On the other hand, if x(θ; s) = 0 for all θ, P (s) = 0.
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Therefore, when the state is s and ` ≥ ¯`, it is optimal to set x(θ; s) = 0 for all θ. Since the choice of ¯`
does not depend on (v, vˆ), taking `∗ = ¯`will complete the proof of part one.
To see part two, first consider ` < −v∗(θH ; 0). This implies that ` < −v∗(θL; 0), as v∗(θL; 0) ≤
v∗(θH ; 0). Now suppose that, for some s = (θ−, v, vˆ), u(θH ; s) = u(θL; s) = `. By (PK’), this implies
that ∑
θ
f(θ|θ−)δw(θ; s) = v − ` > v∗(θ−; `),
which is not possible in a maximal rent contract. Note that the strict inequality holds, since v∗(θ−; `) <
v∗(θ−; 0) for all ` < 0. Therefore, when ` < −v∗(θH ; 0), at least one (LI’) must be slack.
Once again, assume that ` < −v∗(θH ; 0). To see that both (LI’) are slack, observe that by (PK’),
if u(θ; s) = `, then u(θ˜; s) > 0. Now, by (IC’), for all choices of (w(θ; s), wˆ(θ; s)), in the downward
incentive compatibility constraint for type θ misreporting θ˜, the LHS is negative, whereas the RHS is
positive, which is a contradiction.
Taking `∗ = −v∗(θH ; 0), it follows that for ` ≤ `∗ that (LI’) never bind. Therefore, the contract
can be solved by ignoring (LI’). The result for part two immediately follows by Theorem 2.
In part one of Proposition 6, it is implicitly used that the principal will satisfy (PK’) by using
w(θ; s) → ∞. However, this is not possible in a maximal rent contract, as I require that w(θ; s) ≤
v∗(θ). To solve this problem, the principal will initialize the optimal contract with a first promise of
v0 = 0. I present this result in Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. If ` ≥ `∗, then the firm will initialize the optimal contract with v0 = 0.
Proof of Corollary 2. For all v0 > 0 such that there exists vˆ0 with (v0, vˆ0) ∈ W ∗(θ−), it is the case
that P (v0, vˆ0, θ−) = 0. Since (0, 0) ∈ W ∗(θ−) and P (0, 0, θ−) = 0, the firm is indifferent between all
choices of v0, and thus it is without loss of generality to pick v0 = 0.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 2
B.1 Proofs from Section 2.3.2
I prove Theorem 1 by proving the following Theorem and apply the definition of ui(θi, θ−i). Notice
that I am also proving that recursive methods are valid in this paper’s environment
Theorem 2. I can represent the problem recursively and there exists a unique function P such that the
principal’s program can be written as followed
P (v) = max
{qi,pi,wi,x}i∈Γ(v)
∑
i
Eθ
[
pi(θ; v, v0)− c(qi(θ; v, v0)) + δP (wi(θ; v, v0))
]
, (B.1)
where Γ(v) is the set of contracts that satisfy Incentive Compatibility, Promise-Keeping, Liquidity, and
Feasibility. Moreover, P is concave, continuously differentiable, P ′(0) = ∞, and ∃v∗ ∈ [0,∞) such
that P ′(v) > −1 for all v < v∗ and P ′(v) = −1 for all v ≥ v∗.
Proof. Let rt = (rit, r
−i
t ) ∈ Θ be a report in period t, and rt = {rτ}tτ=0 be the public history up to
time t, and denote Rt as the collection of all possible public histories. A private history for agent i in
period t is hti = {θiτ}tτ=ti , where ti is the period agent i was born, and denote H ti as the collection of
all possible private histories for agent i. A strategy for agent i is then a sequence of reports of the form{
rit(θ
i
t, r
t−1, ht−1i )
}∞
t=ti
, where rit : Θ×Rt−1 ×H t−1i → Θ.
At any time tn, there are two agents: one who is already alive (agent o) and one is just born (agent
n) at the beginning of the period. The firm offers a contract to agent i = n of
{
qnt (r
t), pnt (r
t), xnt (r
t)
}∞
t=tn
,
where qnt : R
t → R+ is quality, pnt : Rt → R is price, xnt : Rt → [0, 1]4 and is the inclusion decision.
The old agent is already engaged in a contract
{
qot (r
t), pot (r
t), xot (r
t)
}∞
t=to
,
where to is the period the old agent was born.
Agent i receives the following utility from the contract
E{θiτ}τ>ti
∞∑
t=ti
δt−ti E{θ−iτ }τ≥ti
[
mi(θit, θ
−i
t , xt(r
t))qit(r
t)− pit(rt)
]
+ δt−ti0,
where E{θiτ}τ>ti is the expectation over all θ
i
τ for τ > ti, and E{θ−iτ }τ>ti is the expectation over all θ
−i
τ
for τ ≥ ti. I suppress this notation going forward as Ei and E−i whenever possible. Notice that I
include the value δt−ti0 in the agent’s value of the contract to account for the possibility of an agent
dying.
I invoke the Revelation Principal, and restrict attention to direct mechanism. Therefore, incentive
compatibility requires that, for all t,
Ei
∞∑
s=t
E−i δs−t
[
mi(θis, θ
−i
s , xs(r
s−1, θis, r
−i
s ))q
i
s(r
s−1, θis, r
−i
s )− pis(rs−1, θis, r−is )
] ≥
Ei
∞∑
s=t
E−i δs−t
[
mi(θis, θ
−i
s , xs(r
s−1, ris(θ
i
s), r
−i
s ))q
i
s(r
s−1, ris(θ
i
s), r
−i
s )− pis(rs−1, ris(θis), r−is )
]
,
for all ris(θ
i
s).
Next, define wit(r
t−1, ht−1i , θ
i, θ−i) to be the highest expected continuation value for agent i given
a public history rt−1, a private history for agent i of ht−1i , that agent i reports θ
i in period t, and that
agent −i reports θ−i in period t. That is, rt = (rt−1, θi, θ−i). In other words,
wit(r
t−1, ht−1i , θ
i, θ−i) = sup
{rˆiτ}∞t+1
E{θτ}τ≥t+1
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
[
mi(θis, θ
−i
t , xs(rˆ
s))qis(rˆ
s)− pis(rˆs)
]
,
where rˆs = (rt−1, θi, rˆit, ..., rˆ
i
s, r
−i
t , ..., r
−i
s ) and E{θτ}τ≥t+1 is the expectation operator over all (θiτ , θ−iτ )
for all τ ≥ t+ 1. That is, rˆs is the public history of (rt−1, θi, θ−i) followed by (rˆit+1, ..., rˆis) from agent
i and (r−it+1, ..., r
−i
s ) from agent −i.
Notice that wit(r
t−1, ht−1i , θ
i, θ−i) does not actually depend on ht−1i or θ
i
t, and only on the public
history rt−1. To see this, observe that the contract is a function of the the reported history and the
externality, while a function of today’s realization, is not dependent on past types, since θ is i.i.d.
Therefore, I can write wit(r
t−1, ht−1i , θ
i, θ−i) as wit(r
t−1, θi, θ−i). Hence, I can decompose an agent’s
74
utility into her payoff today and her expect continuation value.
With this in mind, I write incentive compatibility as, for all t,
E−i
[
mi(θit, θ
−i
t , x
i
t(r
t−1, θit, θ
−i
t ))q
i
t(r
t−1, θit, θ
−i
t )− pit(rt−1, θit, θ−it ) + δwit(rt−1, θit, θ−it )
] ≥
E−i
[
mi(θit, θ
−i
t , x
i
t(r
t−1, θ˜it, θ
−i
t ))q
i
t(r
t−1, θ˜it, θ
−i
t )− pit(rt−1, θ˜it, θ−it ) + δwit(rt−1, θ˜it, θ−it )
]
,
for all θit, θ˜
i
t, where, in a slight abuse of notation, E−i is the expectation of θ−it . As per an argument
in Thomas and Worrall (1990), since I require incentive compatibility for each t, I can replace rt−1
with ht−1. But I already argued that the contract does not actually depend on hti, so I write incentive
compatibility as, for all t,
E−i
[
mi(θit, θ
−i
t , xt(θ
i
t, θ
−i
t ))q
i
t(θ
i
t, θ
−i
t )− pit(θit, θ−it ) + δwit(θit, θ−it )
] ≥
E−i
[
mi(θit, θ
−i
t , xt(θ˜
i
t, θ
−i
t ))q
i
t(θ˜
i
t, θ
−i
t )− pit(θ˜it, θ−it ) + δwit(θ˜it, θ−it )
]
,
(B.2)
for all θit, θ
−i
t . Next, define the liquidity constraint in this formulation:
Eθ−it
[
mi(θit, θ
−i
t , xt(θ
i
t, θ
−i
t ))q
i
t(θ
i
t, θ
−i
t )− pit(θit, θ−it )
] ≥ 0. (B.3)
As well, the optimal contract is subject to feasibility constraints:
qit(θ
i
t, θ
−i
t ) ≥ 0,
pit(, θ
i
t, θ
−i
t ) ≥ 0,
xt(θ
i
t, θ
−i
t ) ≥ 0,∑
l
xlt(θ
i
t, θ
−i
t ) ≤ 1.
(B.4)
Let Bk be the set of bk ≡ {qit(ht−1, θit, θ−it ), pit(ht−1, θit, θ−it ), xit(ht−1, θit, θ−it )}i=n,ot=k...,∞ , that satisfy
(B.2), (B.3), and (B.4) for each i, and for all t ≥ k, where k > to. Now define Bk(v) as the set of
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contracts in Bk that provide a lifetime utility of v to agent i = o and v0 to agent i = n. In other words,
Bk(v) =
bk ∈ Bk : Eo
∑∞
t=k En δt−k [mo(θot , θnt , xt(θot , θnt ))qot (θot , θnt )− pot (θot , θnt )] = v
En
∑∞
t=k Eo δt−k [mn(θnt , θot , xt(θnt , θot ))qnt (θnt , θot )− pnt (θnt , θot )] = v0
 .
Obviously Bk(v) is also a function of the exogenous parameter v0. Notice that I can rewrite Bk(v) as
Bk(v) =
bk ∈ Bk : E [m
o(θok, θ
n
k , xk(θ
o
k, θ
n
k ))q
o
k(θ
o
k, θ
n
k )− pok(θok, θnk ) + δwok(θok, θnk )] = v
E [mn(θnk , θok, xk(θnk , θok))qnk (θnk , θok)− pnk(θnk , θok) + δwnk (θnk , θok)] = v0
 .
Define
Pk(v) = sup
bk∈Bk(v)
∞∑
t=k
∑
i
Eθik,θ−ik
[
pik(θ
i
k, θ
−i
k )− c(qik(θik, θ−ik ))
]
.
Observe that 0 ≤ Pk(v) + v ≤ 11−δ
∑
i E [piFB(θi, θ−i)− c(qiFB(θi, θ−i))], which is a direct con-
sequence of the incentive constraints. Let C[0,∞) be the space of continuous function defined on
[0,∞), and let
F ≡
{
Q ∈ C[0,∞) : 0 ≤ Q(v) + v ≤ 1
1− δ
∑
i
E
[
piFB(θ
i, θ−i)− c(qiFB(θi, θ−i))
]}
.
When endowed with the uniform norm, F is a complete metric space. Consider the operator T defined
for Q ∈ F as
TQ(v) = sup
{qi,pi,wi,x}i∈Γ(v)
∑
i
Eθik,θ−ik
[
pi(θi, θ−i)− c(qik(θik, θ−ik )) + δQ(wik(θik, θ−ik ))
]
, (B.5)
where
Γ(v) ≡
 (q, p, x, w) ∈ R
2
+×R2+×[0, 1]4 × R2+ s.t. (q, p, x, w)
satisfy IC, PK, LI, and Feasiblity
 .
First, notice that Pk(v) = TPk−1(v), which follows from induction on k. Therefore this operator
recursively defines the principal’s program.
Now I want to show that if Q ∈ F , then TQ ∈ F . It is clear that 0 ≤ TQ(v) + v. Moreover,
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because of the incentive constraints, it must be the case that
TQ(v) + v ≤ 1
1− δ
∑
i
E
[
piFB(θ
i, θ−i)− c(qiFB(θi, θ−i))
]
.
Next, notice that Γ(v) is a compact set, so TQ(v) achieves its maximum. Moreover, by the Theorem
of the Maximum, TQ(v) is continuous in v. Therefore TQ(v) ∈ F .
Now, suppose Q ∈ F and Q′(v) = −1 for all v ≥ vb, for some vb. I want to show that T preserves
this property. Consider the following relaxed program
max
{qi,pi,wi,x}
∑
i
Eθi,θ−i
[
mi(θi, θ−i, x(θi, θ−i))qi(θi, θ−i)− c(qi(θi, θ−i))
+δwi(θi, θ−i) + δQ(wi(θi, θ−i))
]− v − v0 (B.6)
subject to promise-keeping.
It is straightforward to verify that any solution of this program has qi(θi, θ−i) = qiFB(θ
i, θ−i) =
mi(θi, θ−i, xFB(θi, θ−i)), where xFB(θi, θ−i) = (1, 0, 0, 0). Moreover, one possible solution to this
program has wi(θi, θ−i) = vb.
Additionally, one can verify that all constraints are satisfied by this contract, so it is feasible. As a
result, for all v, v′ ≥ vb, it must be the case that
TQ(v′)− TQ(v) = −(v′ − v),
and hence it follows that TQ′(v) = −1 for all v ≥ vb.
To see that TQ(v) is concave, notice that
∑
i
Eθik,θ−ik
[
pi(θi, θ−i)− c(qi(θi, θ−i))]
is strictly concave. Moreover, the constraint set is a finite collection of linear inequalities, and thus
convex. Hence, adapting an argument from Stokey et al. (1989), it follows that TQ(v) is concave if Q
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is concave.
Next, it is clear that for Q1, Q2 ∈ F such that Q1 ≤ Q2 it must be that TQ1 ≤ TQ2. Moreover,
for Q ∈ F , T (Q+ a) = TQ+ δa. Hence, T is a contraction on a complete metric space, and thus has
a fixed point. Let P denote this fixed point, as defined below
P (v) = max
{qi,pi,wi,x}i∈Γ(v)
∑
i
Eθ
[
pi(θ; v, v0)− c(qi(θ; v, v0)) + δP (wi(θ; v, v0))
]
. (B.7)
Lastly, I want to provide bounds on the derivate of P at zero. In particular, I want to show that
P ′(0) > 0. If I can demonstrate this, then it follows that the optimal contract lies in the interior of the
feasible set, and, from Stokey et al. (1989), that P is continuously differentiable in v.
Now, notice that if v = 0, the optimal contract for agent i = 0 is qo(θoL, θ
n) = 0, qo(θoH , θ
n) =
qFB(θ
o
H , θ
n), wo(θo, θn) = 0, po(θoL, θ
n) = 0,
po(θoH , θ
n) = mo(θoH , θ
n, x)qFB(θ
o
H , θ
n),
and include i = o only if θo = θH . In other words, exclude the low type, and include the high type at
first-best. This is an immediate consequence of Promise-Keeping. And, because wo(θo, θn) = 0, i = o
will receive this contract for as long as she is alive.
Therefore, P (0) yields the principal the value of the aforementioned contract delivered to agent
i = o plus whatever surplus is generated from agent i = n. In other words
P (0) = En [fH(mo(θoH , θn, x)qFB(θoH , θn)− c(qFB(θoH , θn))) + δP (0)] + Eo Πn(0),
where Πn(0) is the surplus generated from the optimal contract for agent i = nwhen the state is v = 0.
For any  > 0, consider an alternative contract for i = o: qo(θoL, θ
n) = y, qo(θoH , θ
n) = qFB(θ
o
H , θ
n),
wo(θo, θn) = 0, po(θoL, θ
n) = mo(θoL, θ
n, x)y,
po(θoH , θ
n) = mo(θoH , θ
n, x)(qFB(θ
o
H , θ
n)− y) +mo(θoL, θn, x)y,
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and always include i = o. Define y by  = En [fH(mo(θoH , θn, x)−mo(θoL, θn, x))y].
LetQ() be the surplus from delivering this contract to agent i = o and the v = 0 contract to i = n.
Therefore
Q() =En [fL(mo(θoL, θn, x)y − c(y)) + fH((mo(θoH , θn, x)qFB(θoH , θn)− c(qFB(θoH , θn)))]
− + δP (0) + Eo Πn(0)
= P (0) + En [fL(mo(θoL, θn, x)y − c(y))− ] .
(B.8)
It can be shown that P () ≥ Q() and lim→0Q() = lim→0 P ().
Now, Q()−P (0)

=
En[fL(mo(θoL,θn,x)y−c(y))]−

, which implies that
lim
→0
P ()− P (0)

≥ lim
→0
Q()− P (0)

= lim
→0
En [fL(mo(θoL, θn, x)y − c(y))]− 

= lim
y→0
En
[
fL
mo(θoL, θ
n, x)y − c(y)
fH(mo(θoH , θ
n, x)−mo(θoH , θn, x))y
]
− 1
= En
[
fL
mo(θoL, θ
n, x)− limy→0 c(y)y
fH(mo(θoH , θ
n, x)−mo(θoL, θn, x))
]
− 1
= En
[
fL
mo(θoH , θ
n, x)− limq→0 c′(q)
fH(mo(θoH , θ
n, x)−mo(θoL, θn, x))
]
− 1
=∞,
(B.9)
where the second equality holds by the definition of  and the last equality by the assumption that
limq→0 c′(q) = −∞. Therefore, it follows that P ′(0) =∞, which completes the proof.
B.2 Proofs from Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2
Proof of Proposition 1. Notice that I can rewrite the firm’s value function as
P (v) = max
{qi,pi,wi,x}
∑
i
Eθ
[
mi(θ, x(θ; v, v0))q
i(θ; v, v0)− c(qi(θ; v, v0))
+δwi(θ; v, v0) + δP (w
i(θ; v, v0))
]− v − v0
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To see this, apply promise-keeping to the original value function. If wi(θ; v, v0) < v∗, then clearly this
value function is increasing inwi. Now, if, for contradiction, E−i ui(θ; v, v0) > 0, then I can decrease it
by  > 0 and preserve liquidity. If I increasewi by 
δ
, then promise-keeping and incentive compatibility
will be preserved. But this is an improvement on the prior contract, which is a contradiction. And thus
in an optimal contract, E−i ui(θ; v, v0) = 0 if wi(θ; v, v0) < v∗.
For the second half of Proposition 1, remember that P + w is maximized at v∗. So if
E−i ui(θ; v, v0) > 0 and E−iwi(θ; v, v0) > v∗,
I could decrease E−iwi(θ; v, v0) in a similar manner as above and increase E−i ui(θ; v, v0). This would
preserve all constraints, but increase the principal’s value function. Therefore it must be the case that
E−iwi(θ; v, v0) = v∗
Proof of Lemma 1. If (MON iq) and (MON
i
x) holds, then from (C
i), I have
E−i
[
ui(θiH , θ
−i) + δwi(θiH , θ
−i)
]
=E−i
[
ui(θiL, θ
−i) + δwi(θiL, θ
−i)
+M i(θiH , θ
i
L, θ
−i, x(θiL, θ
−i))qi(θiL, θ
−i)
]
≤ E−i
[
ui(θiL, θ
−i) + δwi(θiL, θ
−i)
+M i(θiH , θ
i
L, θ
−i, x(θiH , θ
−i))qi(θiH , θ
−i)
]
.
Rearranging this equation, I see that
E−i
[
ui(θiL, θ
−i) + δwi(θiL, θ
−i)
] ≥E−i [ui(θiH , θ−i) + δwi(θiH , θ−ik )
+M i(θiL, θ
i
H , θ
−i, x(θiH , θ
−i))qi(θiH , θ
−i)
]
,
which is precisely (ICij) for j = L.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of Lemma 1 is a straightforward computation using (Ci), (PKn), and
(PKo).
Proof of Proposition 2. From Lemma 1 and Lemma 1, I see that (LiL),(L
i
H), (MON
i
q), and (MON
i
x)
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imply (PKn), (PKo), (ICij), and (LI
i
j). Hence (PR) satisfies all original constraints. To arrive at
the reformulation of the value function in (PR), just plug (PKn) and (PKo) into the original value
function.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, from (FOCw), I see that the optimal wi(θ; v, v0) is solely a function of
fj and λij , and thus not dependent on θ
−i. Next, to see that wi(θiH ; v, v0) ≥ wi(θiL; v, v0), suppose not,
i.e., that wi(θiL; v, v0) > w
i(θiH ; v, v0).
If that is the case, then wi(θiH ; v, v0) < v
∗, which implies that E−i ui(θiH , θ−i; v, v0) = 0. Consider
(ICij) for j = H , and observe that
0 ≥ E−i
[
ui(θiL, θ
−i) + δ(wi(θiL)− wi(θiH)) +M i(θiL, θiH , θ−i, x(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i)
]
.
But the righthand side of this inequality is strictly positive, which is a contradiction. Therefore
wi(θiH ; v, v0) ≥ wi(θiL; v, v0).
Since wi(θiH ; v, v0) ≥ wi(θiL; v, v0), (FOCw) implies that
−1 + λ
i
L
fL
≥ −1 + λ
i
H
fH
,
or fHλiL ≥ fLλiH . From (FOCq), I can see that
qi(θiH , θ
−i; v, v0) ≥ qi(θiL, θ−i; v, v0),
qi(θiH , θ
−i; v, v0) = qiFB(θ
i
H , θ
−i), and qi(θiL, θ
−i; v, v0) ≤ qiFB(θiL, θ−i).
As well, ifmi(θiL, θ
−i, x(θiL, θ
−i)) < M
i(θiH ,θ
i
L,θ
−i,x(θiL,θ
−i))
fL
(fHλ
i
L−fLλiH), then this will imply that
agent i generates negative surplus under this realization, and thus
xb(θiL, θ
−i; v, v0) = xi(θiL, θ
−i; v, v0) = 0.
Finally, notice that when v = v∗, then λiL = λ
i
H = 0, which implies that q
i(θiL, θ
−i; v, v0) =
qiFB(θ
i
L, θ
−i)
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Proof of Proposition 4. I prove this Proposition with a series of claims:
Claim 4.1:
E−i
[
δwi(θiL) + fHM(θ
i
H , θ
i
L, θ
−i, xi(θiL, θ
−i))qi(θiL, θ
−i)
]
≥ E−i
[
δwi(θiH)− fLM(θiH , θiL, θ−i, xi(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i)
]
.
Proof of Claim 4.1. I know that fHλiL ≥ fLλiH , so if λiH > 0, then λiL > 0. That is, it will never be
the case that the modified liquidity constraint for j = L is slack, but binding for j = H . Notice that I
can rewrite (LiL) and(L
i
H) as
vi ≥ E−i
[
δwi(θiL) + fHM(θ
i
H , θ
i
L, θ
−i, xi(θiL, θ
−i))qi(θiL, θ
−i)
]
vi ≥ E−i
[
δwi(θiH)− fLM(θiH , θiL, θ−i, xi(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i)
]
,
and thus the left and righthand side of the inequality
E−i
[
δwi(θiL) + fHM(θ
i
H , θ
i
L, θ
−i, xi(θiL, θ
−i))qi(θiL, θ
−i)
]
≥ E−i
[
δwi(θiH)− fLM(θiH , θiL, θ−i, xi(θiL, θ−i))qi(θiL, θ−i)
]
.
just come from the righthand side of (LiL) and (L
i
H), respectively.
To see that this inequality holds, note that if λiL, λ
i
H > 0, then both (L
i
L) and (L
i
H) bind, and
therefore are equal to vi. Hence, the inequality in question is merely vi ≥ vi. If λiL > 0 and λiH = 0,
then the lefthand side equals vi, but the righthand side is less than vi. If λiL = λ
i
H = 0, then w
i(θiL) =
wi(θiH) = v
∗
i , and therefore the lefthand side is greater. Since I have already ruled out the case of
λiH > 0 and λ
i
L = 0, this completes the proof.
Define
gi(wi, qi) = max{δwi(θiL) + fHM(θiH , θiL, xi(θL))qi(θiL), δwi(θiH)− fLM(θiH , θiL, xi(θiL))qi(θiL)},
where, in an abuse of notation, I have dropped θ−i from the contractual variables. I can reformulate
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the constraints (LiL) and (L
i
H) as, for i = n, o,
E−i gi(wi, qi) ≤ vi.
Now, examine the following relaxed optimization problem: Take (xy, xo) as given, and solve
P (v) = max
q,w
∑
i
Eθ
[
mi(θ, x(θ, v, v0)))q
i(θ; v, v0)− c(qi(θ; v, v0))
+δwi(θ; v, v0) + δV (w
i(θ; v, v0))
]
− v − v0
(PˆR)
subject to E−i gi(qi, wi) ≤ vi, for i = n, o.
Claim 4.2: Any solution (q(v), w(v)) to (PˆR) is increasing in v and yields the same results as
(FOCq) and (FOCw).
Proof of Claim 4.2. This program is a constrained optimization problem subject to inequality con-
straints. The objective function is concave and supermodular in (q, w) and gi(qi, wi) is linear in (qi, wi)
for each i. Therefore, by Quah (2007), the solution to this program is increasing in v.1And clearly this
program will yield the same first order conditions as (FOCq) and (FOCw). Hence (qi(v), wi(v)) is
increasing in v.
Claim 4.3 If v0 < v, then (qn(v), wn(v)) ≤ (qo(v), wo(v)).
Proof of Claim 4.3. To see the second part of Proposition 4, assume that v0 < v. Observe that when
x is given, (qn(v), wn(v)) is independent of v, and vice versa for (qo(v), wo(v)) and v0. Next, when
v0 = v, in an optimal contract (qn(v), wn(v)) = (qo(v), wo(v)). Hence, if v0 < v, it must be the case
that in an optimal contract (qn(s), wn(v)) ≤ (qo(v), wo(v)).
1I am using Corollary 2 from Quah (2007), which is
Corollary 1. Let F : X → R be supermodular and concave, and let G : X → R be continuous, increasing, submodular,
and convex. The argmaxx∈G−1((−∞,k′′]) F (x) is higher than argmaxx∈G−1((−∞,k′]) F (x).
For this paper, F is the value function, which is concave and supermodular in (q, w), and G is gi, which is linear and
thus continuous, increasing, and submodular in (q, w). Taking k′ and k′′ to be values of vi, I get the result. Notice, I am
using the fact that when x is given, maximizing for i = n and i = o are independent optimization programs.
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Putting Claims 4.1-4.3 together, we arrive at Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5. When v = v∗, I know that P ′(v∗) = −1, and therefore, by (ENV ), λiL =
λiH = 0. However, when v < v
∗, P ′(v) > −1, which implies that λiL + λiH > 0. Since u(θH , θ−i) ≥
u(θL, θ
i−), it follows that u(θiL, θ
i−) = 0 and λiL > 0 when v < v
∗. Since the optimal contract is
continuous in v, I must then have u(θiL, θ
i−) = 0 as v → v∗. Hence, to obtain v∗, take (U iL), and set
u(θiL, θ
−i) = 0, qi(θiL, θ
−i) = qiFB(θL), v = v
∗, and wi(θiL, θ
−i) = v∗.
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove this Proposition, I consider two regimes: i) Always admit both types;
ii) Only admit a low type when the realization is θi = θ−i = θL. To complete this proof, consider the
following claim:
Claim 5.1: fL(wi(θiL) + P (wi(θiL)) + fH(wi(θiH) + P (wi(θiH)) is weakly greater under regime ii)
than under regime i).
Proof of Claim. Under regime ii),
(xb(θiL, θ
−i), xi(θiL, θ
−i)) =
 (0, 0) if θ
−i = θH
(1, 0) if θ−i = θL,
whereas under regime i),
(xb(θiL, θ
−i), xi(θiL, θ
−i)) =
 (1, 0) if θ
−i = θH
(1, 0) if θ−i = θL.
Through computation, one can see thatM i(θiH , θ
i
L, θ
−i, x(θi, θ−i)) is greater in regime i) than in regime
ii). If both (LiL) and (L
i
H) bind, this implies that w
i(θiL) is lower in regime i) and w
i(θiH) is greater
in regime i). If neither constraint binds, then wi(θi) is constant across regimes. Finally, if only one
constraint binds, then it must be (LiL), which implies that w
i(θiL) is lower in regime i) and w
i(θiH) is
constant across regime.
Altogether, this implies that wi(θiL) is weakly lower in regime i) and w
i(θiH) is weakly greater in
regime i). Due to the concavity of w+P (w), this implies that fL(wi(θiL) +P (w
i(θiL)) + fH(w
i(θiH) +
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P (wi(θiH)) is weakly greater under regime ii) than under regime i).
Now, given the functional form assumption on c, it can be shown that qi(θiL, θ
−i) is lower in regime
i) than in regime ii). As a result, this implies, along with the preceding Claim that the objective
function, for any given state v, is lower in regime i) than in regime ii). Therefore, if (EX) does not
hold, this implies that regime i) is always dominated by regime ii). By contrast, if (EX) holds, then,
along with Proposition 4, this implies that there exists some threshold v˜ such that for all v < v˜ regime
ii) dominates regime i), and for all v ≥ v˜ vice versa. This is due to the fact that when v = v∗, (EX)
implies that regime ii) dominates. Since the contract is continuous in v, it then must be the case that
there exists a neighborhood around v∗ such that regime ii) dominates.
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